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Abstract	
This	Independent	Study	seeks	to	understand	how	political	parties	create	their	platforms.		Specifically,	this	study	examines	how,	when,	and	why	political	parties	cater	to	the	interests	of	interest	groups	and	the	electorate	regarding	immigration	policy.		Three	qualitative	case	studies	are	examined:	1984,	2004,	and	2016	party	platforms	and	the	corresponding	policy	preferences	of	interest	groups	and	the	electorate.		Bawn	et.	al’s	theory	on	political	parties	forms	the	theoretical	framework	of	this	study,	which	claims	that	parties	are	likely	to	cater	to	interest	groups	when	political	salience	is	low	and	parties	are	likely	to	cater	to	the	electorate	when	political	salience	is	high.		Ultimately,	I	find	that	Bawn	et.	al’s	theory	applies	well	to	my	case	studies.		This	study	provides	insight	into	how	parties	are	motivated	to	change,	especially	within	the	context	of	immigration.		
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I:	Introduction	
	 	The	political	party	is	a	fundamental	vehicle	for	political	participation	in	America.		United	States	public	officeholders,	from	the	local	level	to	Congress,	are	almost	exclusively	members	of	the	two	major	parties.		The	major	parties’	ideologies	shape	political	discourse,	policymaking,	and	American	identity.		However,	parties’	political	ideologies	and	policy	stances	are	dynamic—ever	changing	due	to	shifts	in	public	opinion,	monumental	global	events,	and	party	membership,	among	other	factors.		This	study	aims	to	explain	why	political	parties	shift	their	positions.		 In	an	attempt	to	explain	what	drives	political	parties	to	shift	their	policy	stances,	this	study	examines	the	influence	of	interest	groups	and	the	electorate	on	political	parties’	policy	stances.		In	accordance	with	Bawn	et.	al’s	theory	on	political	parties,	this	study	predicts	parties	to	cater	to	interest	groups	when	an	issue’s	political	salience	is	low,	but	parties	are	expected	to	cater	to	the	electorate’s	interests	when	political	salience	is	high.		 This	study	will	be	viewed	through	the	lens	of	immigration	policymaking.		Immigration	policymaking	was	chosen	out	of	personal	interest	given	its	relevance	in	today’s	national	political	landscape.				 In	Chapter	two,	the	study	will	present	a	review	of	various	literatures	predominately	concerning	theories	on	political	parties,	as	well	as	U.S.	immigration	policy.				 Chapter	three	will	present	the	theoretical	model	of	this	study,	derived	from	specific	components	of	chapter	two’s	literature.		Here,	each	variable	will	be	identified	and	described,	along	with	the	hypothesized	relationship	between	the	variables.	
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	 Chapter	four	will	construct	the	methodological	framework	of	this	study,	explaining	how	data	will	be	retrieved	for	each	variable	and	how	the	data	will	be	measured	and	evaluated.		 In	chapter	five,	three	case	studies	are	presented.		In	each	case	study,	a	different	time	period	of	American	immigration	policymaking	is	presented,	then	the	theoretical	and	methodological	frameworks	from	chapters	three	and	four	are	applied	to	each	case.		For	each	case	study,	the	theoretical	model	is	analyzed	and	evaluated	for	functionality.				 Chapter	six	concludes	this	study	by	comparing	the	theoretical	model’s	application	to	each	case	study,	as	well	as	evaluating	the	study	in	general.		The	evaluation	will	recommend	considerations	for	future	research.		 	
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II:	Literature	Review	
Introduction	
	 The	following	will	provide	an	overview	on	the	literature	of	four	topics,	in	the	following	order:	theoretical	explanations	of	political	party	structure	and	behavior,	the	competing	“orders”	of	race	in	America,	the	history	of	American	immigration	policy	reform,	and	American	identities	and	the	public’s	attitudes	toward	immigration.		Ultimately,	this	review	will	present	the	theoretical	frameworks,	as	well	as	any	relevant	information	concerning	American	immigration,	used	in	following	chapters.		 The	review	will	start	by	discussing	theories	on	political	parties,	beginning	with	Anthony	Downs’	median	voter	theory,	since	it	serves	as	the	basis	for	alternative	theories.		The	review	will	summarize	the	theories'	evaluation	of	influential	actors	within	and	outside	of	parties,	claims	regarding	the	electorate’s	knowledge	of	and	access	to	information,	and	explanations	of	party	polarization.				 The	evaluation	of	American	“racial	orders”	will	consist	solely	of	King	and	Smith’s	account,	which	provides	an	expansive	racial	framework	for	evaluating	American	institutions,	policy,	and	political	actors.		This	racial	framework	will	then	be	applied	to	American	immigration	policy.		 In	terms	of	American	immigration	reform,	this	review	will	focus	on	presenting	a	brief	historical	account	of	past	immigration	policy.		This	historical	account	will	include	involved	policy	making	actors,	as	well	as	differentiating	between	“restrictive”	and	“expansive”	immigration	policy.			 The	final	portion	of	the	review	will	assess	American	identity	and	the	public’s	attitudes	toward	immigration.		This	section	will	discuss	what	traits	Americans	consider	
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fundamental	to	being	a	“true”	American,	as	well	as	how	these	attitudes	reflect	their	perceptions	about	immigration,	and	ultimately	their	dispositions	on	immigration	policy.			
The	Foundation	of	Political	Party	Literature:	Anthony	Downs		 In	his	work,	“An	Economic	Theory	of	Political	Action	in	Democracy,”	Anthony	Downs	has	established	the	foundation	of	the	literature	on	political	parties	and	political	party	agenda	creation.				 Downsian	theory	is	politician-centered,	in	which	individual	politicians	are	viewed	as	the	main	political	actors	that	manufacture	political	action.		In	particular,	it	is	centered	on	politicians’	private	motives,	as	well	as	their	ensuing	social	functions.		Using	the	analogous	subject	of	coal-miners,	whose	social	function	would	be	removing	coal	from	the	ground	while	privately	motivated	“by	his	desire	to	earn	income,	not	by	any	desire	to	benefit	others,”	Downs	classifies	politicians’	social	function	as	proposing	government	policy	while	privately	motivated	by	the	income,	power,	and	prestige	of	being	in	office	(136).		Given	this	social	function	and	private	motive	of	politicians,	Downs	hypothesizes	that,	like	“an	entrepreneur	selling	policies	for	votes	instead	of	products	for	money,”	“political	parties	in	a	democracy	formulate	policy	strictly	as	a	means	of	gaining	votes”	(137).		However,	voters,	as	the	consumers	of	proposed	policy,	face	their	choice	while	possessing	incomplete	knowledge	and	information	regarding	the	products.			 If	voters	were	fully	knowledgeable	and	information	was	costless,	Downs	asserts	that	voters	would	choose	“strictly	as	a	means	of	selecting	the	government	most	beneficial	to	him”	(138).		In	determining	which	candidate	would	provide	voters	with	the	highest	personal	“utility	income,”	voters	would	compare	factual	information	regarding	their	“utility	income”	from	each	party’s	past	performances,	then	modify	their	analyses	according	to	
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estimations	for	the	upcoming	term.		In	anticipation,	the	government	would	recognize	that	every	individual	voter	was	fully	knowledgeable,	so	“each	citizen’s	preferences	would	carry	the	same	weight	as	every	other	citizen”	(139).		In	effect,	an	electorate	with	perfect	knowledge	and	access	to	costless	information	would	motivate	candidates	to	value	each	citizen’s	vote	as	equal	to	every	other	citizen’s.				 Of	course,	the	American	electorate	is	not	fully	knowledgeable	on	politics	and	information	is	in	fact	costly	to	the	average	citizen.		According	to	Downs,	these	circumstances	are	“so	basic	to	human	life	that	it	influences	the	structure	of	almost	every	social	institution”	(139).		The	consequences	of	this	condition,	according	to	Downs,	are	numerous.		He	focuses	on	three:	the	persuasive	nature	of	sharing	information,	parties’	use	of	ideology	to	attract	voters,	and	citizens’	rational	ignorance	in	the	world	of	politics.			 Persuaders—friends,	media	outlets,	campaigns,	etc.—target	uncertain	voters	who	“need	more	facts	to	establish	a	clear	preference”	(139).		Without	the	complete	knowledge	and	costless	access	to	information,	voters	may	not	understand	the	complex	intricacies	of	existing	and	proposed	policy,	how	such	policies	have	or	will	affect	them,	or	what	policies	candidates	and	parties	support.		This	is	a	point	of	entrance	for	persuaders,	who	provide	facts,	although	likely	a	biased	selection,	in	aims	“to	produce	a	decision	that	aids	their	own	cause”	from	uncertain	voters	(140).				 The	presence	and	influence	of	persuasion	within	a	democracy	implies	crucial	roles	for	political	actors	with	significant	political	clout.		Firstly,	given	that	some	citizens	are	capable	of	persuading	large	numbers	of	voters,	“some	men	are	more	important	than	others	politically”	(140).		This	disrupts	government’s	equal	treatment	of	each	citizen	under	circumstances	of	complete	knowledge	and	costless	information.		Rather,	politicians	are	
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motivated	to	cater	their	policy	to	those	who	have	the	capability	of	persuading	the	highest	number	of	voters	as	possible	via	financial	contribution,	media	platform,	etc.				 Second,	since	government	is	also	burdened	by	limited	access	to	information	and	knowledge	–	in	this	case	concerning	voters’	preferences	–	it	must	employ	representatives	that	specialize	in	discovering	public	opinion,	as	well	as	persuading	public	opinion	toward	supporting	public	officials’	policy	(140).		This	extension	of	government	effectively	decentralizes	the	power	of	federal	government.				 Next,	persuasion	is	used	in	the	reverse	sense	–	not	by	the	government,	but	geared	toward	the	government.		The	citizenry,	interest	groups,	and	other	non-governmental	organizations	work	to	persuade	the	government	“that	the	policies	they	stand	for	–	which	are	of	direct	benefit	to	themselves	–	are	good	for	and	desired	by	the	electorate”	(140).		In	turn,	once	politicians	and	parties	commit	to	a	policy,	they	subsequently	work	to	persuade	the	electorate	that	such	policy	is	“good	for	and	desired	by	the	electorate”	(140).				 Finally,	when	persuasion	is	a	valuable	tool	for	both	government	actors	and	non-government	political	actors,	lobbying	becomes	highly	rational	for	all	involved	actors.		Politicians	“sell”	policy	favors	in	exchange	for	campaign	contributions,	favorable	editorial	policies,	and	financial	support	used	for	television	airtime,	propaganda,	and	campaign	employees	–	all	of	which	are	utilized	to	maximize	votes	(141).		In	exchange,	citizens,	advocacy	groups,	and	interest	groups	receive	favorable	policy	stances	from	politicians.		Persuasion	is	vital	to	Downs’	understanding	of	politicians’	aim	of	attracting	the	maximum	votes	under	the	conditions	of	limited	knowledge	and	costly	information.	These	circumstances	also	shape	the	way	political	parties	create	and	advance	their	ideologies.	
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	 Ideologies	are	key	tools	used	by	political	parties	to	cheapen	the	cost	of	information	
for the electorate.  Since voters do not have sufficient information to comprehend each policy 
passed or proposed by politicians, they search for an easier, less arduous way to evaluate 
candidates and parties.  In response, reflecting the previously mentioned motivation of politicians 
to remain in office, Downs insists that parties “invent an ideology in order to attract the votes of 
those citizens who wish to cut costs by voting ideologically” (142).  Political parties’ creation 
and adoption of ideologies also force them to comply with some implications.  Firstly, since 
voters are unlikely to support “unreliable parties,” Downs holds that political parties are forced 
to stand by their ideologies, changing them subtly, but not radically, effectively creating a party 
“brand”.  Second, in order to ensure voters that parties’ ideologies are practical and meaningful, 
parties must act in accordance with their ideologies.  Finally, Downs recognizes that parties’ 
ideologies must distinguish themselves from competing parties, even when appealing to the same 
voters’ interests.  Otherwise, voters will not be willing to pay the cost of assessing candidates 
and choosing between them, since their differences would be unrecognizable.   
 These implications help explain the movement of parties on the ideological scale.  Downs 
expands on Harold Hotelling’s spatial model, which places ideologies on a “left to right” 
spectrum, decided upon by voters.  He explains that parties may shift their ideologies left or 
right, up until an opposing party’s position on the spectrum is reached.  With the private motive 
of winning votes in mind, a party’s ideology will shift toward the most available votes.  In the 
case of a citizenry that supports ideologies near the moderate middle of the spectrum, Downs 
agrees with Hotelling, who claims, “parties in a two-party system inevitably converge on the 
center” (142).  In this case, a change in party from one election to the next has a minimal effect 
on policy change – the electorate is rather close ideologically to either party.  However, Downs 
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counters that if the two most popular ideological stances amongst the citizenry are near opposite 
poles of the spectrum, then the parties will “diverge toward the extremes rather than converge on 
the center” (143).  In this case, “radical alteration in policy” occurs (143).  Furthermore, the 
continual election of one party may lead to the revolt of the opposition, while an alteration 
between the two parties may result in social chaos “because government policy keeps changing 
from one extreme to the other” (143).  In the polarized scenario, Downs urges that either 
ideological stances must shift, otherwise democracy will be replaced by tyranny in which one 
extreme imposes its will upon the other” (143).  Voters’ use of shortcuts to gather political 
information in a less costly manner may not always guide voters to the “correct” choice – 
meaning the choice representing a higher “utility income” – although, Downs ensures that it is 
often completely rational for voters to remain politically ignorant. 
 In order for a voter to rationally become politically knowledgeable, the return for 
collecting information must outweigh its costs.  The average citizen does absorb some costless 
information during their daily lives from the newspaper or radio, but in depth policy information 
remains costly in time and energy to access and understand.  According to Downs, the return for 
becoming politically knowledgeable depends on a voter’s expected gain from voting “correctly” 
for the party that would provide him or her with the highest utility, compared to voting 
“incorrectly” for any other party (146).   However, Downs states, even if a voter does choose the 
“correct party,” “unless his vote actually decides the election…he might as well have voted 
‘incorrectly’” (146).  Given that this is usually the case, Downs sees virtually no marginal return 
for becoming a knowledgeable voter.  He does cite some instances in which the return seems to 
be significant: the election is extremely close, a citizen enjoys being well informed, the citizen 
can influence the votes of others and subsequently the election results, the citizen can influence 
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the government’s assessment of policy preferences, or if the citizen can influence government 
policy as a lobbyist.  Of course, these are not the case for most citizens.  Yet, the cost of voting is 
relatively low, so many can afford to simply vote, albeit often without adequate information to 
make the “correct” choice.   
 Downs lays the groundwork for theoretical expansion with his perception of politicians’ 
private motivation of “income, power, and prestige,” the electorate’s limited access to 
knowledge and costly information, and political parties’ use of ideology to attract voters taking 
shortcuts, (137).  Many use Downs’ work as the foundation of their explanations of the behavior 
of politicians and political parties, especially in creating party ideology and agenda setting.   
Alternative Theories 
The Roots of Party Ideology 
 In examining how shifts in party ideology occur, Noel compares the chronology of 
congressional action and intellectual political dialogue on the subject of race.  He finds that 
intellectuals began developing ideological stances on race prior to their ideologies’ 
implementation in Congressional action.  Beginning in 1910, when liberals were split between 
pro-black and anti-black supporters, progressive intellectuals were sorting out the foundation for 
Congress’s ideological split throughout the following decades.  By 1930, liberal pundits had 
unified as pro-black, advocating for political and social equality for all, including blacks.  In 
1950, liberal and conservative pundits had become polarized in regards to foreign policy, 
economic, and racial issues (168).  Yet, Congress was not nearly as stably polarized on race as 
pundits were throughout this half-century progression.  Not until the 1960’s did Congressional 
voting reflect the ideological contrast that pundits had established thirty years prior. 
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 The liberal ideology’s adoption of pro-black stances supports the theory that intellectuals 
craft ideology, rather than politicians’ and parties’ retrospective ideological rationalizations of 
their policy positions, as described by the Downsian model.  In this instance, Noel explains that 
because the major beneficiaries of progressives’ ideology – blacks and poor whites – were not 
politically powerful, it’s clear that intellectuals were not concerned with maximizing votes when 
crafting their stances.  Why then would coalitions found themselves on such weak voting bases?  
Noel is led to conclude, “while ideology does define a coalition, it does not need to build that 
coalition solely on the basis of voting blocks” (169).  However, Noel does provide some nuance 
between his theory and the Downsian model, explaining that although intellectuals are the first to 
craft ideological stances, it is “the arguments that best unite the various potential coalition 
members that became broadly endorsed” (169).  Noel’s work clarifies the process of ideological 
shifts in party agenda setting, placing intellectual pundits’ concern with coalition building ahead 
of politician and party concern with adopting broadly endorsed ideology.   
Asymmetric Party Theory 
 Grossman and Hopkins present a theory that focuses on the differentiation between the 
Democratic and Republican parties in regard to advancing party agendas.  Their theory is based 
on their analyses of voters’ responses to a survey on party preference and political ideology 
sophistication.  Their findings lead them to an asymmetrical party theory contending that the two 
parties do not mirror each other in internal structures, nor are they made up of symmetrical social 
coalitions.  In this model, the Democratic Party is found to be “understood as a coalition of social 
groups seeking concrete government action,” while the Republicans are rather “an agent of an 
ideological movement whose supporters prize doctrinal purity” (119).  Regarding party agenda 
setting, Grossman and Hopkins find Democrats to discuss more specific policy and marginalized 
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groups by logrolling among members representing diverse constituencies.  According to them, 
Democrats’ focus on various groups and policies creates an “internally conflicted and 
disorganized” party structure “due to jostling groups” (129).  In contrast, Republicans discuss 
broader ideological stances, laden with words like “freedom” and language preferring a “limited 
role for the government” (122).  Also in contrast with Democrats, Republicans benefit from a 
unified party structure surrounding shared policy goals based on ideological purity.   
 In critique of Grossman and Hopkins’ asymmetrical party theory, Hans Noel argues that 
their perceived asymmetry is overstated.  Rather than identifying the Republican Party as purely 
ideological and the Democratic Party as purely concerned with disadvantaged groups, Noel 
claims, “both parties have ideologies that serve to reinforce their coalition members’ demands” 
(Noel, 2015).  Noel mostly critiques Grossman and Hopkins’ methodology, which assessed 
voters’ ideological language as sufficient in qualifying their parties’ functionality.  For example, 
Noel doubts that Republicans’ use of words like “freedom” solely reflects their ideological 
priority.  Rather, he suggests that “freedom” is used to cater to the interests of their coalition 
groups – business and a majority Christian nation.  His same critique applies to Democrats’ 
discussion of specific issues and marginalized groups.  To Noel, their language may be group-
centric when they advocate for marginalized populations, but that is because the Democrats’ 
ideology concerns government intervention to establish egalitarianism.  Ultimately, Noel admits 
that Grossman and Hopkins have acknowledged an important difference between the two parties, 
but Noel asserts that the group-benefit versus ideological language dichotomy that voters use to 
describe their parties does not reflect how parties build their coalitions.   
 “Policy-Demanding Groups” 
	 	 18	
 Bawn et al. concedes Downs’ view that politicians can be motivated by material self-
interest, but they also argue that, led by a coalition of various interests, parties can gear 
themselves toward achieving any range of agreed upon goals, “from material self-interest to 
high-minded idealism” (571).  Bawn et al. terms these party coalition groups,  “policy-
demanding groups,” that are made up of numerous political interest groups and activists.  These 
groups form a mutually accepted policy agenda of both concrete and broader ideological policy 
stances, seek politicians who are committed to their program, and work cooperatively to 
nominate and elect their candidates.  The group’s goal is to ultimately select a candidate whose 
“paramount goal is the advancement of the party program” (Bawn et al. 571).  Throughout the 
coalition-building process, the party creates a “brand” for itself, as Downs discussed as a method 
of providing voters with an ideological shortcut.  Policy-demanding groups influence parties’ 
nomination and electoral support of candidates as a tool that motivates politicians to represent 
the groups’ interests and stick to the group’s brand.  Since a policy-demanding group’s resources 
and support (money, expertise, manpower, etc.) can be retracted if a politician is not actively 
supporting the group’s interests and brand, politicians must push policy along accordingly, not 
according to the voters’ or their own interests – this is central to Bawn et al.’s argument.  The 
idea of establishing a “party brand” is in accord with Downsian theory, but Bawn et. al differs in 
explaining how the brand is created, through complying to interest groups and adjusting to an 
“electoral blind spot.” 
Knowledge and Information 
“Electoral Blind Spot” 
 In accordance with Downs, Bawn et. al recognizes that the electorate is poorly informed 
and unaware of political contexts.  In fact, Bawn et. al even concedes that under conditions of 
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full knowledge and costless information, parties would resort to the center of the ideological 
spectrum, chasing the median voter. However, under realistic conditions of incomplete 
knowledge, they provide evidence that even the ordinary, ill-informed voter can recognize 
blatant extremism and tends to actively reject it at the polls (577).  The point at which voters do 
recognize extremism is a focal point of Bawn et. al’s argument concerning how parties agenda 
set to satisfy policy-demanding interests, as well as voters.   
 Candidates who propose policies that voters do not recognize as extreme are said to be 
located within the “electoral blind spot” (577).  Here, parties are able “to win with candidates 
more extreme than swing voters would like if they knew better” (577).  This is one way that 
parties can advance their interests without solely catering to the median voter.   
Symbolic vs. Ideological predispositions  
 Reinforcing their asymmetrical party theory, Grossman and Hopkins observe 
contradictory political preferences within the American electorate.  They divide the public’s 
political predispositions into two camps: symbolic and operational.  Symbolic predispositions 
reflect the public’s opinion on broad issues, like the government’s size and power, while 
operational predispositions refer to opinions on narrow, specific policy issues (122).  
Symbolically, a large majority of the public favors a conservative view in support of a small, less 
powerful government with few services.  Yet, operationally, the public is found to be 
overwhelmingly liberal, possessing leftist views concerning issues like the environment, health, 
education, and even crime and welfare (122). Ellis and Stimson argue that these contradictory 
preferences are the result of “many citizens simply misunderstand[ing] ideological terminology” 
– another example of an electorate that is not politically knowledgeable (123).    
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 In Grossman and Hopkins’ asymmetrical party theory, the state of public knowledge and 
opinion has separate circumstances for Democrats and Republicans.  For Democrats, this process 
means that Democratic politicians “must provide concrete benefits to a diverse set of constituents 
without activating public opposition to ‘big government’” (133).  For Republicans, these 
circumstances mean party members, who’re “constrained by the need to maintain popular appeal 
beyond the party base, are vulnerable to charges from within [party] ranks that they’ve have 
strayed from principle and must be forced back in line” (133).  This challenge can be seen in 
Bawn et. al’s description of party coalitions’ ability to revoke resources from a candidate or 
office-holder that has “strayed” from representing the coalition’s interests. 
Party Polarization 
“Electoral Blind Spot” 
 Party polarization, not to be confused with voter polarization, is one implication of a 
growing “electoral blind spot” cited by Bawn et. al.  Parties work to nominate and elect 
candidates that are extreme enough to advance the party’s interests, yet not extreme enough to be 
recognized by the ordinary voter.  As the “electoral blind spot” grows, as it does when “political 
excitement runs low,” “members of Congress can take extreme positions with little risk of 
defeat” (Bawn et. al 578, 2012).  Even amid politically salient times, when incumbents are voted 
out, they’re replaced with equally as extreme candidates from the opposite end of the spectrum 
(Bawn et. al 590, 2012).  To the dismay of voters, this “leapfrog representation” has resulted in a 
scarcity of centrists in Congress.  Not only are legislators more extreme than voters would like, 
but those in office are able to ‘”appear moderate, yet enact extremist policy under the veil of 
procedural votes that are ‘too obscure for citizens back home to understand’” (Bawn et. al 584, 
2012).  Yet, Bawn et. al does cite evidence finding that “better-informed electorates favor 
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centrists,” but “most voters live in districts in which mass communication about their 
Representative is likely to be sparse,” meaning voters lack accessible information and political 
knowledge (583).   
Asymmetric Polarization 
 Grossman and Hopkins provide a nuanced view of asymmetrical polarization in 
accordance with their asymmetrical party theory.  They find that, driven by its concern with 
ideological purity, the Republican Party has polarized in a more organized, mobilized way than 
the internally conflicted Democratic Party.  The Tea Party is used as the contemporary example, 
founded by supporters of Barry Goldwater’s 1964 campaign.  Yet, Parker and Barreto note that 
the Tea Party “is simply the latest in a series of national right-wing social movements that have 
cropped up in America since the nineteenth century,” ensuring that this offshoot of the 
Republican Party is not irregular, but rather a continuation of ideological polarization from the 
right (Grossman and Hopkins 122, 2015).  Grossman and Hopkins do not find a comparable 
polarization from the Democratic Party.  They explain that this contrast is credited to “the 
unequal pressure placed on officeholders by their respective popular bases” (Grossman and 
Hopkins 130, 2015).  That is, reflecting their desire for ideological purity, Republicans 
“consistently voice a desire for their party to become more conservative” (Grossman and 
Hopkins 130, 2015).  Meanwhile, reflecting their concern for compromise to address various 
groups’ interests, “a majority of Democrats prefer that the Democratic Party become more 
moderate” (130).   
Racial Institutional Orders  
 King and Smith, in their analysis of the two competing racial coalitions in America, the 
“white supremacist order” and the “egalitarian transformative” order, include components of 
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both Bawn et. al and Grossman and Hopkins.   Their theory focuses not on parties, but rather 
“racial institutional orders” consisting of state institutions, political actors, and organizations that 
have “adopted racial concepts, commitments, and aims in order to help bind together their 
coalitions…and serve the interests of the architects” (King and Smith 75, 2005).  Similar to 
Bawn et. al’s claim that parties can be controlled by “policy demanders” working toward 
anything “from material self-interest to high-minded idealism,” King and Smith describe the 
motivation of “racial institutional orders” to be economic, political, “to quiet social anxieties, or 
to further ideological goals” (Bawn et. al 571, 2012; King and Smith 75, 2005).   
 These “racial institutional orders,” like any other coalition, have been “complex and 
breakable,” changing in membership in order to remain powerful enough to remain effective 
(King and Smith 76, 2005).  The competing racial coalitions’ dichotomy is comparable to the 
differences in parties described by Grossman and Hopkins. 
 The “white supremacist order,” referred to contemporarily as the “anti-transformative 
order,” resembles the Republican Party in Grossman and Hopkins’ study, focusing on ideological 
purity.  Although founded on exclusionary anti-black interests surrounding slavery and 
segregation, the contemporary “anti-transformative order” aims to “oppose measures explicitly 
aimed at reducing racial inequalities,” since such measures may stifle their mission for “greater 
equality in the long run” (King and Smith 83, 2005).   This negative ideology, focusing on 
opposing measures rather than passing them, reflects the “Vote No, Hope Yes” trend in 
Republican congressional voting in which Republicans couldn’t risk voting in favor of pragmatic 
measures, like raising the debt ceiling, due to their obligation to protect their personal 
conservative voting record.  The “anti-transformative order,” much like Republicans in 
Grossman and Hopkins’ account, is “united by rejection of [direct action to reduce material 
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racial inequalities in the near term]” (King and Smith 83, 2005).  Similar parallels can be drawn 
between the “egalitarian transformative order” and Grossman and Hopkins’ portrayal of the 
Democratic Party. 
 The “egalitarian transformative” order was founded as early as America, built against 
monarchy and aristocracy, rejecting slavery (King and Smith 80, 2005).  Yet, it was not always 
visible, as this order suffers from many of the same problems that Grossman and Hopkins find 
the Democratic Party to struggle with – finding a comprehensive, unifying agenda within an 
ideology based on multiple groups’ interests.  Based on directly imposing measures to reduce 
racial inequality, this order’s actors frequently shift their focus and resources between groups and 
issues.  Although all actors within the order are motivated by reducing racial inequality, they do 
not always agree upon specific issues—economic, political, cultural— or which marginalized 
groups to focus resources on.  Like the Democratic Party’s group-centric structure, the 
“egalitarian transformative order” has often lacked unity behind a singular cause.  Both racial 
orders play integral parts in advancing their agendas within American politics, as well as 
solidifying America’s racial identity.  
 It is worth noting that King and Smith’s theory of racial institutional orders is primarily 
included within this literature review as a framework to view politics, history, power, which may 
be useful in future studies, especially regarding policymaking. 
A Brief History of U.S. Immigration Reform 
 Literature describes U.S. policy’s attempts at comprehensive immigration reform 
throughout the 20th and 21st century as an effort by “strange bedfellow” political coalitions, 
whose memberships consist of what are usually considered to be political rivals. Positions on 
immigration have even tended to crosscut ideological and partisan lines.  This is visible from 
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pro-immigration conservatives who “value immigrant labor for national growth and prosperity” 
alongside liberals that acknowledge American democracy’s growth via “welcoming new and 
diverse immigrants as equal citizens” (Tichenor 42, 2008).  Meanwhile, anti-immigration 
conservatives support restrictionist policy due to “cultural, national security, and sovereignty 
priorities,” while some liberals wish for “greater economic and social justice for the nation’s 
least advantaged citizens before extending opportunities to new arrivals” (42).  These “strange 
bedfellow” coalitions have been dynamic, adjusting alongside ever-changing political contexts, 
but their unique makeup have made comprehensive immigration reform difficult to achieve.  
 Immigration policy has aimed to address two aspects of immigration: the rate of 
immigration into the U.S. and the civil and social rights of the immigrants within the U.S.  
“Restrictionists” support policies aiming to restrict the rate of immigration and, or, the expansion 
of immigrant rights.  In opposition, “expansionists” endorse policies that expand the rate of 
immigration and, or, immigrant rights.  These policies have been advanced with economic, 
national security, and, or, cultural concerns in mind.   
 The earliest U.S. immigration policies, from the 19th century to the mid 20th century, 
aimed to control the rate of immigration into the U.S. mostly by implementing national quota 
systems.  After the Civil War, immigration policies targeted minorities with discriminatory 
policy ensuring white supremacy over Asians in the West with policies like the 1882 Chinese 
Exclusion Act and The Johnson-Reed 1924 Immigration Act, which enacted a quota system that 
“erected formidable barriers to southern and eastern Europeans and reinforced Asian exclusion” 
(Tichenor 44, 2008).  Strange bedfellow coalitions existed even then, when some African 
Americans favored such racial discrimination due to their fear of competition from immigrant 
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labor, meanwhile “as far back as the 1920’s the NAACP denounced all such race-based 
immigration restrictions as wrongful discrimination” (King and Smith 238, 2011).   
 Other policies facilitated the importation of immigrants in order to exploit cheap labor.  
For example, in 1942, the State Department pleased Southwestern growers and other business 
interests when they worked with the Mexican government on the Bracero Program “to facilitate 
the importation of Mexican guest workers” to address the labor shortage accompanying World 
War I (Tichenor 45, 2008).  Organized labor lobbied against agribusiness for reform throughout 
the Bracero Program, citing “depressed wages and destroyed working conditions” that 
“compromised the ‘security’ of American workers” (Tichenor 46, 2008).  As the 1960’s 
approached, the civil rights movement pushed the parties’ support toward more welcoming 
immigration policies, ending the Bracero Program in 1963 prior to the 1965 Immigration Act’s 
termination of the national quota system (King and Smith 238, 2011).   
  Transitioning from policies centered on national quota systems to those with “priority to 
family reunification, immigrants with economic skills, and refugees from political oppression,” 
race-based immigration stances became replaced with “color-blind” proposals. (King and Smith 
239, 2011).  For Republicans, this meant supporting a large increase of immigrants as an 
economic stimulus, as well as serving as a “’haven for the oppressed,’ particularly ‘victims of 
Communist tyranny’” (King and Smith 238, 2011).  Democrats also found an economic value in 
increased immigration, but centered their stances on anti-discrimination ideals, hoping “’to 
implant a humanitarian and liberal spirit in our nation’s immigration and citizenship policies, 
making them more consonant with ‘the rights of man’” (238).  By 1968, both parties supported 
anti-discriminatory immigration policy, mirroring their acceptance of civil rights bills and ideals. 
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After the civil rights movement spurred the elimination of the national quota system in 1965, 
immigration reform turned its attention to undocumented immigration, an issue of increased 
salience due to a spike in illegal immigration credited to family reunification components of the 
1965 Immigration Act. 
 As illegal immigration became more salient, legislators aimed to address the ensuing 
problems with the anti-discriminatory “color-blind” policies that became widely accepted 
throughout the 1960’s, focusing on equal rights and opportunity.  From this perspective, policy 
proposals focused on fears of “a substantial underclass,” in which undocumented immigrants 
wouldn’t receive “protection from abuse on the job or from landlords, discrimination, disease, or 
crime; they may avoid education for children, and they are unable or reluctant to assert political 
or legal rights” (Tichenor 48, 2008).  This was visible during the previously mentioned Brasero 
Program, when the U.S. agreed “pledged that wages, living conditions, workplace safety, and 
medical services would be comparable to those of native workers,” but employers and 
administrators played no part in following through (Tichenor 45, 2008).  A frequent solution 
from legislators was, and continues to be, placing sanctions on employers of undocumented 
immigrants.  
 Again, support for immigration policy crosscut partisan ties, creating strange bedfellow 
coalitions.  Liberal Democrats worried that undocumented immigrants would “compromise” 
labor protections and antipoverty programs, while another faction of the Democrats feared that 
such sanctions “would lead to job discrimination against Latinos, Asians, and anyone else who 
looked or sounded foreign” (Tichenor 47, 2008). Conservatives were split as well; pro-business 
advocates deemed that sanctions were unfair to employers, while pro-sanction conservatives 
demanded the restoration of law and order.  With gridlock preventing any effective policy 
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proposals from gaining traction, drawn out attempts toward comprehensive immigration reform 
were fruitless throughout the 1970’s and well into the 1980’s. 
 The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) was symbolic of the previous 
decades’ coalitional gridlock.  With “fierce resistance” from business interests, ethnic and civil 
rights groups, religious lobbies, immigrant rights organizations, and both the Republican Reagan 
administration and House Democrats, legislators lacked the consensus necessary for strong 
policymaking (Tichenor 50, 2008).  Given the political pressure from all of these groups, IRCA 
was only able to enact a “compromised package of watered-down employer sanctions provisions, 
legalization for undocumented aliens living in the country since 1982, and a new Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker program to appease grower interests” (Tichenor 50, 2008).  In terms of 
illegal immigration, “IRCA had done virtually nothing to discourage it” (Tichenor 50, 2008).  
Yet, legal immigration, with little political opposition, was increased extensively.  
 As “strange bedfellow” alliances continued to hinder progress on successful immigration 
policy, their presence also shaped the variety of immigration policy that was able to pass.  King 
and Smith compare the alliances on issues of overall immigration levels and their enforcement 
with alliances on issues of immigrants’ social and civil rights.  They find “strange bedfellow” 
alliances more present within the former.  Effectively, this finding supports the claim that “rights 
restrictionists have had greater success in shaping modern policies than immigration 
restrictionists or champions of stringent enforcement policies” (King and Smith 241, 2011).  This 
was exemplified in immigration policy passed following IRCA in 1986.   
 In the early 1990’s a number of events sparked anti-immigration sentiments.  The 
implementation of NAFTA, which promoted Mexican immigration, Islamic immigrants’ 
bombing of the World Trade Center, and controversy stoked by Haitian and Cuban refugees are 
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all cited by King and Smith as salient issues within the 1990’s that led to pressure for anti-
immigration policy (King and Smith 245, 2011).  Amid pressure to “reduce immigration levels, 
deport the undocumented, deny immigrants public benefits, and limit immigrant social and civil 
rights generally,” the Republican Party platform aimed to “stop illegal immigration,” and the 
Democratic Party stood by their anti-discriminatory platform (King and Smith 245, 2011).   
Throughout the 1990’s, various Republicans advanced policy proposals to “expedite deportation 
of undocumented immigrants suspected of terrorism,” “deny immigrants access to public 
benefits,” “restrict birthright citizenship for children of [short-stay] alien parents,” and “lessen 
immigration overall” (King and Smith 245, 2011).  Democrats followed the Republicans’ lead 
against illegal immigration, “endorsing denials of ‘welfare benefits’ to ‘illegal aliens’” (King and 
Smith 245, 2011).  In 1996, with overwhelming bipartisan support, substantial policy was passed 
in the wake of rights restrictionist consensus from both parties: the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).  In all, these policies expedited deportation of “suspected alien 
terrorists or criminals,” “made immigrants ineligible for federally funded benefit programs for 
five years,” and “increased resources for immigration law enforcement, including detentions” 
(King and Smith 246, 2011).  Together in an anti-discriminatory coalition, “Black, Hispanic, and 
Asian Caucus House members overwhelmingly opposed IIRIRA,” while conservative Democrats 
supported it (King and Smith 247, 2011).  In reaction to this wave of restrictionist policymaking, 
“a new generation of foreign-born voters…have created fresh electoral incentives for national 
politicians to guard expansive immigration policies” (Tichenor 58, 2008). 
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 Since the rights restrictionist movement in the 1990’s, immigration has remained 
virtually unchanged.  An “anti-terrorist political climate” followed the 9/11 attacks, which 
“favored the tougher enforcement views within the governing Republicans,” but employer 
interests and a growing Latino voter base stood between substantial policymaking (King and 
Smith 248, 2011).  Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the Republican platform 
“stressed the economic value of immigration, called for immigrants’ ‘cultural integration,’ as 
well as improved enforcement including a border fence and ‘sweeping new powers to deport’” 
(King and Smith 247, 2011).  The Democrats however, supported various methods of obtaining 
citizenship, as well as sanctions for employers of undocumented immigrants, while “opposing 
worker programs” (King and Smith 247, 2011).   
 The effectiveness of American immigration policy has long been plagued by “the 
inability of Americans to agree on responses to racial inequities,” which has resulted in 
incomprehensive reform, unable to address the problem of illegal immigration and favoring 
business’s desire for cheap, exploitable labor (King and Smith 249, 2011).  Not only have 
Americans disagreed on remedies to racial inequities and illegal immigration, but the “strange 
bedfellow coalitions” that have made up restrictionist and expansionsist coalitions have limited 
policymakers’ ability to assemble effective compromises within a comprehensive piece of 
legislation.  Yet, as minority and foreign-born populations grow within the U.S., contemporary 
policymakers must take into account their generally expansionist preferences.  
American Identity and Public Attitudes Toward Immigration 
American Identity  
 As previously mentioned, King and Smith’s “racial institutional orders,” like any other 
coalition, have been “complex and breakable” (King and Smith, 2005, 76).  These coalitions 
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have changed to best benefit the interests of their architects, as well as to remain viable amid 
dynamic political contexts.  One important component for racial coalitions’ membership and 
agendas has been the public’s American identity: attitudes about what it means to be an 
American and policy preferences reflective of such attitudes.   
 Citrin et. al examines American identity in order to understand the public’s attitudes  on 
issues like public education, immigration, affirmative action, and voting rights, as well as the 
rising numbers of Asian and Hispanic minorities (1125).   Using symbolic politics theory, based 
on the role of symbolic cultural attitudes in political predispositions, Citrin et. al analyzes survey 
responses to the question, “what criteria does the mass public use to define American nationality 
and what are current attitudes toward the growing number of Hispanic and Asians?”  Some of the 
traditional qualities of American cultural tradition include “liberal” virtues such as “political 
participation, economic individualism, and egalitarian social manners” (Citrin et. al 1130, 1990).  
Yet, Citrin et. al also cite “belief in God and competence in English,” as well as “standing up for 
one’s country against its critics,” as “ethnocultural” characteristics of a more restrictive 
American identity.  A wide array of respondents for Citrin et. al’s survey question allows for a 
better understanding of what drives American identity. 
 Consensus is undoubtedly present in Citrin et. al’s findings.  Three quarters of their 
sample found the more “liberal” characteristics of Americanism, such as “treating people of all 
races and backgrounds equally,” to be “very important” in being a “true American” (1130).  
“Symbolic” characteristics, like religion or linguistic capabilities, received varying levels of 
consensus.  In terms of religion, consensus was less present; 64% of strong conservatives and 
26% of strong liberals found belief in God to be “very important” in making up a “true 
American” (Citrin et. al 1131, 1990).  Attitudes on language did resemble consensus; throughout 
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respondent groups, English speaking was identified as a “very important” characteristic for 
Americanism.  Even Hispanic and Asian respondents, although at lower levels than others, 
agreed that English speaking is an integral part to what makes someone American (131).  
Although Citrin et. al do find a legitimate consensus on a number of characteristics of 
Americanism, some groups are less likely to find any symbolic characteristics of Americanism. 
 Educated and wealthy respondents were much less likely to identify symbolic 
characteristics as vital components of being American.  According to Citrin et. al, this disparity 
between the “elite” and the general public has “the potential for populist outbursts” (1149).  For 
example, in California, Arizona, Colorado, and Florida, ballot successful ballot initiatives have 
made English the states’ official language.  Citrin et. al argue that the implications of ideological 
tension between the elite and general public may depend on “the salience of ethnic issues,” as 
well as immigrants’ ability to assimilate rapidly to American life (1149).   Aside from 
designating English as the official language, Americanism fuels predispositions on a number of 
other policy issue areas. 
 Americanism’s role in founding policy predispositions is confirmed by Citrin et. al’s 
findings concerning affirmative action, public education, and voting rights.  Those respondents 
identifying symbolic Americanism were found to likely object measures of affirmative action, 
“presumably because this violates the principle of equal treatment based on individual merit” 
(1143).  In public education, Citrin et. al find that respondents widely oppose bilingual education 
programs that aim to maintain Hispanic and Asian children’s native tongue.  Rather, respondents 
favor transitional bilingual education that is ultimately taught in English – unless such a program 
would require a tax hike.  So, effectively, “the onus of assimilation is placed on the immigrants 
themselves” (1143).  Lastly, respondents were found to oppose voting rights to those who cannot 
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read English.  Each of these analyses controlled for partisan allegiance, economic standing, and 
social location, leaving Americanism—or the belief in symbolic cultural identity required to be 
an American—as the sole independent variable.  
American Identity and The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Immigration  
 Much like the policy issue areas described above, national identity plays a telling role in 
shaping the public’s attitudes toward immigration.  In their article, Public Attitudes Toward 
Immigration, Hainmueller and Hopkins look to explain what motivates the public attitudes of 
developed democracies on the subject of immigration.  Among other conclusions, they cite two 
main patterns: national interest is more influential in forming immigration attitudes than issues of 
self-interest, and on a related note, perceptions of immigrants’ effect on symbolic group traits 
(often cultural, but sometimes economic) “are powerful correlates of immigration attitudes” 
(Hainmueller Hopkins 242, 2014).   Concerning the effect of national issues, they provide the 
example of economic stress.  Amid personal economic strife, their respondents did not change 
their attitudes toward immigration.  Yet, amid national economic recession, respondents were 
found to shift toward “anti-immigration attitudes” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 231, 2014).   
 Hainmueller and Hopkins cite a variety of influential examples concerning perceived 
effects of immigration on symbolic group traits and well-being, including ethnicity, religion, 
language, and although less often than cultural issues, economy.  For instance, “Americans who 
take an ethnocultural view of national identity,” which Citrin et. al cites as a large portion of the 
American public, “are more supportive of restricting immigration” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 
235, 2014).  The tendency to support restrictionist immigration policy also applies to 
“respondents who held more assimilationist conceptions of American identity,” meaning they 
expect immigrants to learn English and quickly adapt to American norms, rather than living 
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according to the norms of immigrants’ home country.  Such assimilationist conceptions are 
visible in the respondents of Citren et. al’s survey regarding bilingual education programs.  In 
contrast, those that hold “civic conceptions of identity,” like the widely accepted values of 
political participation and economic individualism referred to in Citrin et. al, “correlate with less 
restrictionist attitudes.”  This may seem contradictory, since citizens can undoubtedly stand for 
both ethnocultural and civic conceptions of national identity, but Hainmueller and Hopkins 
explain that public attitudes toward immigration can shift depending on the political context of 
the present. 
 Mass media, stereotypes, and the political salience of national immigration issues are all 
factors with the potential to shift the American public’s attitudes toward immigration, according 
to Hainmueller and Hopkins.  Stereotypes of immigrant groups are often created through the 
“portrayals of these groups by parties and the mass media” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 233, 
2014).  Plus, depending on mass media’s coverage on immigration, it can become a salient issue. 
In this case, Hopkins’ research finds, “at times when immigration is nationally salient, living in a 
community with a growing immigrant population is associated with more restrictive views.  At 
other times, there is no such relationship, suggesting a role for national politics in politicizing 
local contexts” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 237, 2014).  The salience of immigration is reported 
to “have the potential to mobilize broad swaths of the electorate,” subsequently; “immigration is 
thus an issue with the potential to emerge suddenly and to destabilize political alignments” 
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 232, 2014).  Given the previously discussed “threats” that publics 
perceive immigration to present on their nations and cultures, immigration salience is most 
expected to shift public attitudes toward restrictionist immigration preferences, as stated by 
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Hainmueller and Hopkins; “when salient, immigration has the potential to mobilize otherwise 
left-leaning voters in a right-leaning direction” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 233, 2014).  
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III: Theory 
Introduction 
 This study will examine, in terms of immigration policy, the causal relationship between 
interest groups’ policy preferences and party platform setting.  Based on a review of the 
literature, I hypothesize that unless immigration becomes politically salient, interest groups will 
have a significant direct influence on shaping party platforms on immigration policy.  When 
immigration does become salient, however, I would expect for parties’ immigration policy 
platforms to cater to the electorate’s immigration interests, not interest groups’.  This argument is 
presented in the flow diagram below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanation of Variables 
Independent Variable: Interest Groups’ Immigration Policy Preferences 
 In this analysis, the immigration policy preferences of various interest groups will serve 
as the independent variable.  Specifically, the “restrictive” or “expansive” qualities of the interest 
groups’ policy preferences will be identified.  “Restrictive” immigration policy simply intends to 
restrict the levels of immigration permitted and, or, the civil and social rights of immigrants, for 
Independent	Variable		Interest	Groups’	Immigration	Policy	Preferences	
Dependent	Variable		Political	Parties’	Immigration	Policy	Platform	
Conditional	Variable		Salient	Immigration	Issues	
Figure	1	
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example: limiting immigrants’ rights to receiving public benefits, getting jobs, and gaining 
citizenship.  Expansive policies intend to do the opposite: raise immigration levels, expedite the 
naturalization process, facilitate family reunification, and grant asylum to refugees.  The interest 
groups selected for examination will derive from King and Smith’s competing “racial 
institutional orders.”  
 King and Smith define racial institutional orders to be first an institutional order: “A 
coalition of governing state institutions, non-state political institutions, and political actors that is 
bound together by broadly similar senses of goals, rules, roles, and boundaries that members of 
each order wish to see shaping political life in certain areas” (King and Smith 78, 2005).  
Secondly, racial institutional orders “seek and exercise governing power in ways that predictably 
shape people’s statuses, resources, and opportunities by their placement in ‘racial’ categories” 
(King and Smith 78, 2005).  King and Smith identify two main competing racial institutional 
orders in America; the “anti-transformative order” aims to reject explicit attempt to reduce racial 
inequality, while the “transformative order” aims to enact explicit means to reduce racial 
inequality.  Both will be taken into account in this study. 
 Due to the exceptionally broad range of actors within racial institutional orders’ 
memberships, for practicality’s sake this study will focus solely on interest groups representative 
of each respective racial institutional order.  Plus, as noted in the following Dependent Variable 
section, Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties places particular significance on the influence of 
interest groups on political parties.   
 King and Smith describe “the American state as comprised of multiple institutional 
orders, including competing racial orders with conflicting ideologies” (King and Smith 76, 
2005).  So, given the orders’ conflicting nature, the policy preferences of both racial institutional 
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orders, no matter their motivation, ought to conflict to some extent.  Since the coalitions that 
make up institutional orders are “breakable and complex,” the coalitions’ goals and memberships 
will shift throughout various eras of immigration policy reform.  In fact, at any given time, an 
actor may not be fully dedicated to a racial institutional order across all policy issues.   
 Although the members within these orders will have distinctive motives for their 
membership, whether economic, political, social, or ideological, their collectively shared 
immigration policy goals define their identity as a coalition, regardless of their motivation for 
membership.  That being said, even if the orders’ immigration policy preferences do not 
explicitly identify race as an element of their concern, King and Smith assure us that even 
“features of American politics that may appear unrelated to race,” for instance “modern 
immigration policies,” can be explained by racial institutional orders (King and Smith 78, 2005).   
 In fact, immigration policy coalitions have been referred to as “strange bedfellow 
coalitions” due to their unordinary memberships that consist of what are usually considered 
political rivals.  These coalitions crosscut partisanship, creating shared policy goals between, for 
example, conservatives concerned with national security and liberals desiring justice for 
disadvantaged Americans prior to accepting immigrants (Tichenor, 2008). In the case of 
immigration policy, despite the rivalry that is usually present between the members of “strange 
bedfellow coalitions,” their shared policy preferences form a coalition that can be evaluated 
under King and Smith’s theory of racial orders. 
Dependent Variable: Political Parties’ Immigration Policy Platform  
 The immigration policy agendas of both the Republican and Democratic Parties will be 
evaluated as the dependent variable in this study.  More specifically, the policies’ restrictive or 
expansive qualities, as described above, will be measured.  This study will analyze the 
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relationship between the independent variable (racial institutional orders’ immigration policy 
preferences) and the dependent variable (the restrictiveness and expansiveness of party agendas’ 
immigration policies).     
 In this study, the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is 
founded on theories of political parties from Hans Noel and Bawn et. al.  Noel’s theory focuses 
on parties’ adoption of ideology.  He finds that political pundits and intellectuals craft ideologies 
without regard for electoral acceptability.  These ideologies may take decades to become 
electorally viable for political parties to eventually adopt and implement them.  Given the history 
of American racial institutional orders, Noel’s findings are central to examine the relationship of 
this study.  For example, King and Smith explain that amidst the “xenophobic and racist 
intentions” of the national quota system that was in place from the 1920’s to the 1960’s, the 
NAACP acted within the “transformative order,” denouncing the system’s discrimination.  Yet, 
the “transformative order’s” immigration work did not become visible in party ideology until 
1965, when immigration policy reform ousted the quota system, prioritizing family reunification 
and the acceptance of refugees from communist rule.  This “lag” in parties’ adoption of ideology 
will be taken into account when analyzing the relationship between independent and dependent 
variables.  Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties helps explain why parties adopt ideologies 
and, furthermore, when parties must cater to the electorate, rather than the interests of “policy 
demanders.” 
 Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties deems that interest groups and activists, coined 
“policy demanders,” are central to parties’ organization.  Policy demanders form coalitions “to 
capture and use government for their particular goals, which range from material self-interest to 
high-minded idealism” (Bawn et. al 571, 2012).  These policy demander coalitions influence the 
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party to create party agendas and nominate candidates.  Policy demanders then support the 
party’s candidates through the electoral process with money, expertise, manpower, and other 
resources.  The coalition’s membership benefits by its ability to “nominate and elect a large 
number of legislators—possibly even a majority—committed in advance to a program that 
incorporates the group’s goals” (Bawn et. al 576, 2012).  In fact, given the minimal level of 
political knowledge that Bawn et. al attributes to the electorate, “policy demanding groups” are 
able to utilize an “electoral blind spot” to advance their party program in extreme ways that the 
electorate would not actually support with a full understanding of the policy.  Immigration 
policy, however, has not often been an issue of consensus within policy demander coalitions, 
causing unusual coalition membership in each party, as well as compromised party positions on 
immigration.  
 Immigration policy “strange bedfellow coalitions” crosscut partisanship, which is a main 
reason that efforts toward comprehensive immigration policy reform, no matter the partisan 
makeup of Congress, have often fallen short.  Yet, Bawn et. al’s theory explains that policy 
demanders’ various, often conflicting immigration policy preferences are formed into a singular, 
shared party agenda.  That is, since policy demanders present opposing preferences concerning 
immigration policy, in order to please the most policy demanders, or at least the most supportive, 
parties must stand for a platform that adheres to policy demanders’ preferences in some aspect, 
while avoiding to neglect opposing policy demanders’ interests.  This compromise between 
policy demanders’ interests has formed weak versions of immigration policy.  This explanation 
of party agenda setting, along with Noel’s theory on parties’ adoption of ideology, provide a 
framework to examine how racial institutional orders’ immigration policy preferences affect the 
eventual adoption of immigration policy stances in party agendas. 
	 	 40	
Conditional Variable: The Salience of Immigration 
 A conditional variable, when present, disrupts the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables.  In this case, the conditional variable is an increased salience 
surrounding the issue of immigration.  For example, national security crises, refugee crises, and 
national economic depressions are capable of arousing nativist notions of national identity, 
subsequently shifting both political parties’ agendas toward “restrictionist” immigration policy 
stances.  Such “salient immigration-related threats have the potential to mobilize broad swaths of 
the electorate,” which, according to both Downsian median voter theory and Bawn et. al’s 
“electoral blind spot,” would expectedly affect the agendas of political parties (Hainmueller and 
Hopkins 232, 2014).  As previously mentioned, Bawn et. al’s “electoral blind spot” claims that 
due to the general electorate’s minimal political knowledge, parties are able to push policy that is 
more extreme than the electorate would knowingly accept.  Yet, amid an increased salience of 
immigration, the “electoral blind spot” would shrink, meaning the electorate would become more 
aware and knowledgeable on the issue of immigration and parties’ immigration policy stances.  
Consequently, Bawn et. al explains that the parties must act according to Downsian median voter 
theory, shifting their policy stances toward an electorally viable position. 
 When immigration is salient, restrictionist sentiment would most expectedly ignite, 
although not always.  Shifts toward restrictionist immigration policy amid threats to national 
security, the economy, or cultural identity can be explained by King and Smith’s racial 
institutional orders, as well as the ethnocultural state of American identity.  King and Smith 
describe the racial agenda of the “anti-transformative order” as “a negative one,” where “its 
actors and institutions oppose measures explicitly aimed at reducing racial inequalities” (King 
and Smith 83, 2005).  Furthermore, they explain that the “anti-transformative forces” are “more 
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united against most changes than egalitarian actors and institutions are united in pushing for any 
changes,” effectively meaning “both political parties have incentives not to pursue policies that 
whites find threatening too ardently or openly” (King and Smith 84, 2005).  Given the literature 
on American identity and attitudes toward immigration, threats can range from linguistic 
differences to national security.   
 Citrin et. al find an ethnocultural American identity as existent and widely visible in their 
respondents, including notions that Americans ought to speak English, believe in God, and 
“stand up for their country amid criticism” (Citrin et. al, 1990).  Hainmueller and Hopkins 
expand on these findings, claiming that those who hold ethnocultural views of national identity 
are more likely to support restrictionist immigration policy (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).  
Especially within the realm of immigration policy, increasingly salient political contexts can 
mobilize this electorate. 
 Hainmueller and Hopkins present the idea of “galvanizing effects,” which have the 
ability to intensify the attitudes of “those already predisposed to opposed immigration” 
(Hainmueller and Hopkins 238, 2014).  For example, Republicans with exposure to Spanish 
speakers are less likely to support “a pathway to citizenship.”  In fact, restrictive policy 
advocates have even had success attracting liberal support when “immigration is framed as a 
national security threat” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 238, 2014).  Clearly, the salience of 
immigration-related issues is able to have a significant impact on political opinion toward 
immigration, as well as party agenda setting on immigration policy. 
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IV: Methodology 
Methodological Approach and Case Study Selection 
 This study aims to apply Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties to understand the 
relationship between racial institutional orders and political party agenda setting in terms of 
immigration policy.  A comparative case study will be implemented on a selection of the major 
party agendas after 1964.  This time frame has been chosen due to the revolutionary Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1965, which reshaped U.S. immigration policymaking contexts.  The 
specific platforms included in this study will be from the years 1984, 2004, and 2016.  These 
specific party platforms have been selected due to their place in time, just prior to major 
congressional efforts for immigration reform.   
 This method is most appropriate given that the theoretical model will be applied to 
numerous cases in order to answer process questions concerning party platform setting.  Plus, 
since immigration policy is the subject matter, a limited number of cases are available to 
examine within United States immigration policymaking.  This study can potentially be 
replicated using future cases, as political contexts and immigration policy will provide new 
cases.  
Independent Variable  
 The independent variable of this study is the immigration policy preferences of the 
opposing racial institutional orders.  Since racial institutional orders consist of a vast range of 
governing state institutions, non-state political institutions, and political actors, it will be 
necessary to isolate a select sample of institutions from each order (King and Smith, 2005). To 
evaluate each racial institutional order’s immigration policy stances, this study will identify 
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interest groups that consistently represented each orders’ immigration preferences.  Then, these 
findings will be applied to Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties.   
 King and Smith cite “neorestrictionist groups,” such as the Federation for American 
Immigration Reform (FAIR) and NumbersUSA, as interest groups within the “strange bedfellow 
coalitions” for reducing both levels of immigration and the rights of immigrants.  These groups 
will serve as representatives of the anti-transformative racial order.   
 Numerous resources will provide measurable data for “neorestrictionist groups’” 
immigration preferences, including: testimonies from congressional hearings, historical 
newspaper articles, and information from interest groups’ own websites and publications.  
 In the transformative order, “ethnic advocacy groups,” such as the NAACP and the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) were cited as members of 
the “strange bedfellow coalition” against reducing immigration and for the full civil and social 
rights for immigrants.  These organizations will serve as representatives of the transformative 
racial order.  Similar resources to those used for “neorestrictionist groups” will be used to collect 
data concerning “ethnic advocacy groups’” immigration policy preferences. 
 Using the data collected on both “neorestrictionist groups” and “ethnic advocacy groups,” 
each group will be placed on a spectrum, rating their policy preferences’ “restrictiveness” and 
“expansiveness.”  The spectrum will range from “High Expansive” to “High Restrictive,” with 
less extreme distinctions between the two.  Those interest groups with policy preferences 
consisting of three or more “restrictionist” or “expansive” policies will be designated within the 
according “High” classification.  Interest groups supporting only one policy will be considered 
“Low.”  In the event that an interest group supports both “restrictive” and “expansive” policies, 
the group’s “net” preference will determine its place on the spectrum.  For example, if an interest 
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group supports two expansive policies and one restrictive policy, then the group would be 
considered “Low Expansive” on the spectrum.  Also, it is important to note, that the quality of 
policy preferences will be taken into account.  For instance, if a policy preference advocates for 
extremely restrictive or expansive policy content, it will have a greater net worth, 
consequentially influencing its rating. 
 
 
 To measure the restrictiveness or expansiveness of these interest groups’ immigration 
policy stances, this study must distinguish what sort of policies are to be considered “restrictive” 
or “expansive. 
Restrictive Immigration Policy Expansive Immigration Policy 
• Decrease immigration levels 
• Increase militant border 
patrol/detention facilities/deportation 
efforts 
• Decrease granting asylum 
• Limit immigrant access to public 
benefits 
• Limit immigrants’ ability to work/work 
for fair wages 
• Exclude home countries eligible for 
emigration to U.S. 
• Increase immigration levels 
• Expansion of granting asylum 
• Allow family reunification in U.S. 
• Expand immigrant access to public 
benefits  
• Expand immigrants’ ability to 
work/work for fair wages 
• Expand home countries eligible for 
emigration to U.S. 
Figure 3 
 In terms of restrictive immigration policies, these will be considered any policies that aim 
to decrease the level of immigration, or the social, civil, or political rights of immigrants.  
High	Expansive	 Low	Expansive	 Neutral	 Low	Restrictive	 High	Restrictive	
Immigration	Policy	Preference	Spectrum	
Figure	2	
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Specifically, these could be policies aiming to increase border patrol or deportation, decrease 
granting asylum, limit immigrant access to public benefits, or eliminate their ability to work for 
fair wages.  
 Expansive policies are considered to work toward increasing levels of immigration or 
facilitate the full functionality of social, civil, and political rights of immigrants.  Specifically, 
expansive policies could come in the form of expanding asylum granting, family reunification, 
immigrant access to public benefits and fairly paid work, or eligible countries from which 
immigrants may emigrate. 
Dependent Variable  
 To observe the dependent variable, major parties’ agendas regarding immigration policy, 
a content analysis will be performed focusing on published party platforms, and presidential 
acceptance speeches.  This data will come from the University of California Santa Barbara’s 
“Presidency Project,” where speech manuscripts and party platforms have been gathered dating 
back to the 19th century.  These sources will be evaluated by the same standards of immigration 
policy “restrictiveness” or “expansiveness” detailed above, evaluating both the qualitative and 
quantitative correlations between independent and dependent variables.  
Conditional Variable  
 The conditional variable, an increased salience of immigration, will be measured using 
polling data on public opinion.  Specifically, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 
created a data set on the topic of the 1965 U.S. Immigration Act.  This data surveys public 
attitudes about preferred immigration levels, specific immigrant groups, and the criteria for 
immigrants’ entry into the U.S.  Polls categorizing respondents’ groups (social, demographic, 
partisan) will be included when possible.  Even more central to the conditional variable will be 
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the polls from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research that ask the question, “what do you 
think is the most important problem facing this country today?”  This survey data will most 
accurately identify when immigration becomes salient within the political context.  
 Specifically, the salience of immigration will be considered present when immigration is 
in the top five most important issues identified by respondents in the Roper Center data.   
Applying these relationships to Theory 
 According to Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties, we would expect the identified 
interest groups, both from the anti-transformative order and the transformative order, to have 
legitimate influence on party agenda setting.  This would be a positive relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables.  That is, Bawn et. al’s theory would expect to see interest 
groups working as “policy demanders,” effectively forming coalitions to successfully advance 
their interests via the political party.  In this case, the result would be visible quantitative and 
qualitative correlations between the immigration policy preferences of the interest groups and a 
corresponding immigration policy agenda within the political parties.   
 It is worth noting, however, with Noel’s theory of party ideology in mind, that party 
agendas may not reflect policy demanders’ interests immediately.  Rather, Noel found that 
pundits and political intellectuals initially crafted party ideologies long before parties adopted 
them.  So, the relationship between interest groups’ immigration policy preferences and political 
parties’ immigration policy agendas is expected to potentially exhibit this same delay.  This 
delay, according to Bawn et. al, would be credited to shifts in the balance of power within policy 
demander coalitions.  To verify whether interest groups’ delayed influence on party agendas is 
due to the dynamics within a party’s policy demander coalition, other “core party groups” will be 
compared with the selected interest groups. These “core party groups” represent a significant 
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segment of each party’s policy demander coalition, so by comparing their immigration policy 
preferences with the selected “ethnic advocacy groups” and “neorestrictionist groups,” each 
party demander coalition’s dissension or consensus on immigration policy will clarify.    
According to Bawn et. al, if the policy demander coalitions were in agreement on an issue, the 
party ought to act relatively responsively to the coalitions’ interests.  In the Democratic Party, 
large labor organizations’ immigration policy preferences will be evaluated, while the Chamber 
of Commerce will represent the Republican Party’s policy demander coalition.   
 Should it be found that Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties is not evident within this 
relationship, then “policy demanders” would not be found to play the central role in party agenda 
setting.  This would be visible amid a complete lack of interest group and activists’ immigration 
policy preferences inclusion within party agendas.  Rather, amid a typical political context, party 
agendas may solely reflect electorally concerned politicians’ interests. 
 The relationship between independent and dependent variables ought to endure amid a 
somewhat normal political context, but Bawn et. al cites a conditional variable that may interrupt 
this relationship: an abnormally salient political context.  If immigration were to become an 
increasingly salient political issue, Bawn et. al’s theory would expect a shrinking “electoral blind 
spot,” within which the general electorate would become increasingly aware of political issues, 
policy, and politicians’ decisions.  When the electorate is more knowledgeable than usual, Bawn 
et. al claims that it notices and rejects extreme policies (which often benefit policy demanders).  
Effectively, this means that in order to remain electorally viable, parties must react according to 
Downsian theory, shifting their policy stances toward the electorate’s preferences.   
 Considering the literature on the American public’s attitudes toward immigration, an era 
of abnormally salient immigration issues would provoke restrictionist attitudes from the public 
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(Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).  Events like terrorist attacks, refugee crises, or national 
economic crises are often capable of increasing the salience of immigration.  For example, after 
the attacks of September 11th, 2001, national security became a leading priority for the American 
public, leading to a spike in those desiring a decrease in immigration levels (Roper Center).  It 
would therefore be expected for the relationship between the Independent Variable and 
Dependent Variable to be disrupted when immigration became a salient issue.   
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V: Case Studies  
 
Case #1: Party Platforms of 1984 
 
Narrative 
 
Post 1965: The Rise of Illegal Immigration  
 
 In the near-decade following the passage of The Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965, concern grew regarding the ensuing extent of illegal immigration.  Although the 1965 act 
revolutionized American immigration policy by eliminating the national quota system and 
focusing on family reunification, “the new policy perversely encouraged illegal immigration, 
especially from Mexico” (King and Smith 239, 2011).  Increased illegal immigration resulted 
from the act’s inclusion of “a numerical ceiling of 120,000 on annual immigration from the 
Western Hemisphere,” along with the scantly obeyed requirement for low-skilled workers to 
prove their secured employment prior to achieving legal status (King and Smith 239, 2011).  As 
“back-door” immigration provided cheap labor to U.S. agricultural employers, Mexico’s 
population was growing while its job market was not.  Consequentially, five years after the act’s 
passage, the number of undocumented Mexican immigrants entering the U.S. doubled (Zolberg 
321, 1990).  After 1965, lawmakers’ would shift their focus to addressing increasing rates of 
illegal immigration, although not without a lengthy bargaining process between legislators, 
parties, and interest groups.  
Efforts Toward Immigration Policy Reform 
 Like many previous attempts toward immigration policy reform, a lack of consensus that 
crosscut party lines made for arduous legislative bargaining, delaying comprehensive reform 
until the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).  President Jimmy Carter was the 
first President to take action to address the rising rates of illegal immigration; in 1977, he 
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proposed a bill to Congress with the foundational components of the eventual 1986 bill.  
Although Congress voted against President Carter’s proposal, in response, The Select 
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was created in 1978 “to conduct a 
comprehensive study and evaluation of existing laws, policies, and procedures” (Zolberg 322, 
1990).  Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, then President of the University of Notre Dame and former 
Chair of the United States Civil Rights Commission, chaired the commission.  Other members 
included former Florida Governor Reubin Askew, Director of Criminal Justice Planning for the 
city of Los Angeles Rose Ochi, Cuban immigrant and creator of the Labor Council for Latin 
American Advancement Joaquin Francisco Otero, former Director of the California Rural Legal 
Assistance Justice Cruz Reynoso, various executive department Secretaries, and members of 
both Senate and House Judiciary Committees.  The commission led to a swift decision in 1980 to 
separate the refugee admittance process from the immigration process completely, although 
comprehensive immigration policy reform would take years of frustrating compromising to 
finalize. 
The Simpson-Mazzoli Act 
 The product of The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy was the 
Simpson-Mazzoli Act, referring to the bill’s authors: Republican Wyoming Senator Simpson and 
Democrat Kentucky Congressman Mazzoli. The package proposal focused on two main 
provisions: sanctions directed upon employers of illegal aliens and amnesty for illegal aliens who 
had resided in the U.S. for a certain minimum amount of time. These proposals met both strong 
support and opposition from various interests.  Organized labor and immigration restrictionists 
supported employer sanctions, while Hispanics and civil rights advocates cheered the amnesty 
proposal.  Yet, agricultural employers, especially on the West Coast, opposed the original 
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proposal due to their concerns of labor shortages.  They called for the inclusion of a guest worker 
program to offset the effect that employer sanctions would have on their labor force.  However, 
ethnic rights advocates adamantly opposed growers’ desire for a guest worker program, citing 
the lack of labor and civil rights granted to foreign workers, along with their inability to apply for 
permanent residency (Wong 34, 2006).   These interests would lobby for years until lawmakers 
could compromise the conditions of passable policy.    
Success in the Senate, Delay in the House 
 The Simpson-Mazzoli Act’s first attempt at passage occurred in 1982, when it was 
enacted by the Senate, but not the House, where, along with agricultural interests’ dismay 
regarding a shrunken labor force, Hispanics and civil rights advocates strongly opposed the 
identification requirements within the employer sanction provision (Zolberg 323, 1990).  The 
House’s inability to pass legislation continued as a trend throughout the bargaining process. 
 Throughout 1983 and 1984, the House worked toward their second attempt at passage.  
Agricultural interests lobbied fervently for the inclusion of a guest workers program — they 
were successful.  In 1984, the Panetta amendment was added to the House’s version of the bill, 
which “liberalized” growers’ ability to “obtain foreign workers on seventy-two hours’ notice” 
(Wong 34, 2006).  As a liberal Democrat from agricultural California, Congressman Leon 
Panetta’s endorsement placed the left’s stamp of approval on the worker’s program, convincing 
other Democrats to vote in favor of the bill.  In addition, the existing guest worker H-2 program 
was “expanded from 40,000 temporary foreign crop-pickers a year to between 300,000 and 
500,000” (Zolberg 323, 1990).  Of course, organized labor was opposed to such an expansion to 
foreign workers, but they “failed to mount a serious campaign against the amendment.”  The 
Panetta amendment was passed in the House with vast Republican support (138 to 15 in favor) 
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and reluctant Democratic support aided by Democrat Congressman Leon Panetta’s endorsement 
(90 to 157 against).  With the agricultural sector on board, to ensure Democratic and Hispanic 
support, the bill’s last amendment “prohibited employers from discriminating against legal aliens 
in hiring or recruiting workers” (Zolberg 325, 1990).  Just prior to the 1984 Democratic National 
Convention, the House’s bill passed 216 to 211: Democrats against 138 to 125, Republicans in 
favor 78 to 73 (Pear, 1984).  
Conference Committee 
 Once both the House and Senate versions of Simpson-Mazzoli had passed, the next step 
was expected to be “to form a conference committee, which would send its compromise bill back 
to each chamber for final approval” (Zolberg 325, 1990).  Despite the House’s last minute efforts 
to appease Hispanics with anti-discrimination provisions, this plan was obstructed when 
Hispanic Democratic delegates’ announced that they planned to boycott the first ballot at the 
DNC in protest of Simpson-Mazzoli.  Subsequently, uneasy with his ability to win the 
nomination without the Hispanic delegation’s support, the Democratic Party’s presidential 
nominee, Walter Mondale, referred to Simpson-Mazzoli as “harmful,” spurring “over forty 
House Democrats who had voted for the bill to demand the Panetta amendment be dropped.”  
This twist threatened the possibility for any compromise or policy advancement, as many 
Democrats then stood in opposition to Simpson-Mazzoli. 
 Still, the Senate and House conferenced after the DNC, unsure if any compromise was 
possible after the Democrats’ 1984 denunciation of Simpson-Mazzoli.  In order to get Democrats 
back on board with any passable legislation, restrictive provisions were diluted in the 
conference’s version of the bill: visa availability for citizens’ siblings was expanded and the 
Panetta Amendment was dropped in exchange for the House bill’s expansion of the H-2 
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Program.  Yet, in response to the absence of the Panetta Amendment, “the American Farm 
Bureau Federation opposed the bill because it did not meet the needs of producers of perishable 
commodities” (Zolberg 326, 1990).  And, in contrast to agriculture’s concerns, the AFL-CIO 
found the H-2 program expansion far too generous.  By the end of the 98th Congressional term, 
no compromise was made and comprehensive immigration reform seemed improbable. 
Back to Square One  
 In the 99th Congress, the determined Senator Simpson used his influential role as assistant 
majority leader to kick start efforts for immigration reform.  Now his third revised edition of the 
Senate bill, some initial aspects were tweaked: amnesty would be contingent upon a presidential 
committee’s evaluation of immigration law enforcement, employer sanctions became civil, not 
criminal punishments, and farmers were given three years to employ undocumented immigrants 
prior to the implementation of strict employer sanctions.  In response, the bill gained support 
from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, who had opposed earlier versions.  Yet, in response to the 
diminished amnesty provisions, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) strongly opposed 
the bill, while The League of United Latin American Citizens and MALDEF “said they would 
oppose the new version even more adamantly than the old,”  (Zolberg 327, 1990).   
 On the Senate floor, agricultural interests’ lobbying appeared to pay-off, as Senator Pete 
Wilson (R-California), proposed a guest workers program allowing for 200,000 to 300,000 
annual workers.  Liberal Democrats, and some Republicans including Simpson were strongly 
opposed, citing “greed” as agricultural interests’ motivation for the program (Pear, 1985).  With 
only 15 Democrats in support of the proposal, the amendment to “establish a guest-worker 
program for perishable crops, with an upper limit of 350,000 workers a year” passed 51 to 44 
(Zolberg 328, 1990).  Then, with 69 for (41 Republicans and 28 Democrats) and 30 against (11 
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Republicans and 19 Democrats), the final bill passed in the Senate.  Yet, the House was not 
nearing passage and compromise continued. 
 Peter Rodino, Democrat New Jersey Congressman and chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, led the House’s efforts toward a passable bill.  In fact, he introduced his own 
proposal amid calls to action from reform supporters.  The Rodino bill resembled the original 
Simpson-Mazzoli, including immediate amnesty without the inclusion of a guest worker 
program.  Far from agreeing with the Senate bill’s heavy guest-worker provisions, Rodino 
delayed compromise until the next year, 1985, allowing for time to prepare for compromise with 
agricultural interests.   
Compromise in the House 
 Democrat Brooklyn Congressman Schumer orchestrated the ensuing compromise 
between agricultural interests and liberal Democrats, providing the House with momentum 
toward passable legislation.  With the help of Californian Democrats Panetta and Berman, who 
served as excellent liaisons between Democrats and agricultural interests, the Schumer proposal 
“was designed to guarantee farmers a ready supply of labor while preventing exploitation of the 
foreign workers by providing them with the opportunity to become permanent residents” 
(Zolberg 320, 1990).  The proposal was met with support from labor and objection from 
conservative Republicans against “the ‘giveaway’ of permanent resident status to illegal aliens 
who worked just sixty days” (Zolberg 320, 1990).  Although the Schumer proposal inched the 
House toward passage, House Republicans preferred the Senate’s inclusion of a guest-worker 
program to Schumer’s proposals.  With only 13 Republicans in support, by a vote of 202 to 180, 
“the House defeated a resolution to bring the Schumer’s bill to the floor…the bill was dead” 
(Zolberg 332, 1990).   
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 As the Congressional term neared adjournment, in a desperate attempt for reform, the 
Reagan administration urged House Republicans to bring the bill back to the floor in order to 
amend the Schumer provisions, although Democrats blocked their effort 235-177 (230 
Democrats against and 5 for).  
 In response, Senate and House supporters worked on compromise off of the floor.  The 
compromise lengthened the necessary number of workdays necessary for legalization and set a 
limit of 350,000 foreign workers to be accepted over a three-year transitional period.   
Final Compromise and Passage 
 In a quick and dramatic turnaround, given the restrictive alterations to the Schumer 
proposal’s guest worker provisions, Republicans provided a large enough minority support to 
pass the bill in the House (Democrats in support 168 to 61 and 61 Republicans for, 105 against).  
Since the Democrats’ opposition to the 1984 House bill, 30 more joined in support, including 
five of eleven Hispanic representatives (Zolberg 333, 1990).   
 The final compromise between the Senate and House again forced compromised between 
the existing bills.  Regarding employer sanctions, serial offender employers would face criminal 
charges, although the General Accounting Office was given the power “to report to Congress on 
the effects of sanctions, and if they were found to create severe discrimination or problems for 
employers, Congress might reexamine and even repeal this portion of the law” (Zolberg 334, 
1990).  Also, the House’s generous 1982 deadline for immigrants seeking amnesty was adopted.  
However, the provision mandated those applying to spend a year as a “lawful temporary 
resident,” then “apply for status as permanent residents if they could demonstrate ‘minimal 
understanding of ordinary English’ and a basic knowledge of U.S.  history and government” 
(Zolberg 335, 1990).  In regard to a worker program, the Schumer proposal remained, albeit 
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altered; those who worked for at least ninety days in agriculture were eligible for permanent 
residency after a two-year period as a “temporary resident.”    
 In the bills ultimate passage, then referred to as the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA), the house approved 238 to 173 (look up spread) and the Senate approved 63 to 24 (34 
Dems for and 8 against, 29 Republicans for and 16 against) (Zolberg 335, 1990).   
Interest Groups’ Policy Preferences 
 
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) 
 FAIR’s stance in support of immigration reform remained steadfast throughout Simpson-
Mazolli’s bargaining efforts.  Most essentially, FAIR supported the employer sanctions provision 
of Simpson-Mazzoli, which they referred to as “the heart and soul of any immigration reform 
proposal.  Without employer sanctions, there can be no immigration reform” (United States 268, 
1985).  FAIR deemed the 1983 House proposal “a jobs bill,” citing the millions of American 
workers who would gain work given undocumented immigrants “displacement” of Americans in 
the workforce (718, 1983).  Although FAIR thought employer sanctions to initiate progress 
toward limiting immigration, they continually urged for additional restrictive provisions 
throughout the bargaining process.  
 All of FAIR’s concerns with proposed legislation were based on their core argument: all 
immigration must be limited, including legal and refugee entries.  Most broadly, FAIR lobbied 
for a cap on all immigration, proposing a ceiling of 425,000, including family re-unification 
efforts.  Accordingly, FAIR also publicly rejected all forms of amnesty within any proposals, 
claiming that the provisions would encourage increased immigration from family members and a 
disrespect for law and order, while failing to accomplish long-term goals of controlled 
immigration (719, 1983).  In response to generous amnesty proposals, FAIR proposed a more 
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restrictive version, calling for the eligibility of only “those who have lived in this society 
productively for many years,” including a cut-off date in the mid-1970’s.   
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
 Throughout the bargaining process, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stood opposed to 
Simpson-Mazzoli due to its most fundamental provision: employer sanctions.  They argued the 
bill would “shift the burden of enforcing the nation’s immigration laws from the Federal 
government to the private sector” (344, 1983).  Although, the Chamber endorsed Simpson’s third 
revision of the Senate’s bill in 1985 as “an improvement,” when employers were relieved of “the 
burden of verification” and penalties for employment of undocumented immigrants were 
pronounced civil, rather than criminal (Zolberg 327, 1990). 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) 
 Although in support of the included amnesty provisions and legalization programs, 
MALDEF strongly opposed Simpson-Mazzoli from creation to enactment due to its inclusion of 
employer sanctions and guest-worker programs.   
 Throughout the compromises, MALDEF denounced guest-workers programs due to the 
laborers’ lack of civil, political, social, and labor rights.  In the 1979 Immigration policy and 
procedure hearing before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, a MALDEF representative 
referred to “the creation of a temporary resident status group that would not be eligible for any 
social welfare benefits was essentially the creation of a working caste in this country” (United 
States Commission 8, 1979).   
 In regard to employer sanctions, MALDEF claimed that the provision would “have a 
discriminatory impact on Hispanic and recent immigrants whose physical and/or linguistic 
characteristics are associated with undocumented immigrants” (122, 1985).  
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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
 The NAACP took an in between stance throughout the IRCA compromises, supporting 
both employer sanctions and amnesty for undocumented immigrants.   In respect to employer 
sanctions, the NAACP hoped to “improve employment opportunities for the low-skilled who are 
most vulnerable to competition from undocumented workers” (Library of Congress 17, 1983).  
Given that African-Americans are “disproportionately represented in the ranks of unskilled 
workers,” it isn’t surprising that the NAACP sided with labor on this issue.  For the same reason, 
the NAACP also rejected any expansion of a guest workers program, “as long as there was high 
unemployment in the country” (Library of Congress 20, 1983). 
 However, the NAACP sided with other civil rights groups in support of amnesty.  
Alongside the American for Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), among others, the NAACP lobbied for an increasingly 
recent date for undocumented immigrants’ eligibility to receive permanent status.  Plus, these 
groups stood against a 1983 provision of “summary exclusion” that “would have allowed INS 
inspectors to immediately exclude, without a hearing, aliens without documentation or a 
reasonable basis for legal entry or who were not requesting asylum” (Library of Congress 18).  
In fact, then NAACP director Althea Simmons claimed, “summary exclusion strikes the heart of 
our democratic system.”   
The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 
 The AFL-CIO took a stance similar to the NAACP, supporting employer sanctions to 
protect the American worker’s job and wage, but labor rejected guest workers programs that did 
not permit eventual permanent residency (Library of Congress 170, 1983).  Labor also supported 
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legalization efforts that expanded union membership, but urged for cautiousness in increasing 
legal immigration until illegal immigration was under control.  
Public Opinion   
1965-1995 Attitudes Shifted Toward Anti-immigration 
 Amid the passage of The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, attitudes toward 
immigration into the U.S. were positive, even somewhat ambivalent.  Then, 33% of the public 
called for immigration levels to decrease, 39% called for immigration to remain at the present 
level, 7% supported an increase, while 20% had “no opinion” (Gallup).    Yet, as the 1970’s 
approached, Americans were faced with a slowing economy and refugee crises from Vietnam 
and Cuba, along with an uptick in illegal immigration. 
 Illegal immigration, slow job growth, and multiple refugee crises seemingly shifted 
Americans’ immigration views toward the restrictionist camp.  From 1965 to 1986, the 
population calling for the present level of immigration decreased from 39% to 35%, those calling 
Figure	4:	“Immigration.”	Gallup.com.	http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/Immigration.aspx	(March	24,	2017).	
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for more immigration remained at 7%, and, most notably, the portion of Americans desiring a 
decrease in immigration rose from 33% to 49%, while the 20% of previously undecided 
respondents dropped to 9%.  It is important to note, however, that given the increases in 
immigration levels during this 21 year span, those supporting increasing or maintaining 
immigration levels in 1986 are inherently more supportive of immigration than those in 1965. 
But, immigration was not the issue of any election from ‘72 to ‘84 
 From 1972 to 1984, exit polls have asked voters, “What do you think is the most 
important problem facing this country?”  During this timespan, neither immigration, nor illegal 
immigration showed in a reported top response.  Overshadowed by issues like inflation, 
unemployment, and the potential of nuclear war, immigration seemingly took a backseat during 
these elections. 
Opinion on IRCA versions  
  In terms of public opinion regarding IRCA, in 1986, following almost a decade of policy 
bargaining, the New York Times reported, “the public supported the broad outlines of the 
Figure	5:	“Immigration.”	Gallup.com.	http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/Immigration.aspx	(March	24,	2017).	
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original Simpson-Mazzoli package but strongly disapproved of guest workers (58 to 36 percent) 
(Zolberg 331, 1990).  The previously noted increase from 1965 to 1986 in public preference for 
decreased immigration supports the claim that the public supported the broad outlines of 
Simpson-Mazzoli, which aimed to address high illegal immigration rates.  
 Regarding race, minorities were much more likely to support generous immigration 
policy, as 61% of Hispanic respondents supported an increase or maintenance of immigration 
levels.  In contrast, only 39% of Whites supported an increased or maintained immigration 
levels.  Blacks split the difference between Hispanics and Whites—52% supported increased or 
maintaining immigration levels—resembling the NAACP’s stance: in favor of decreasing illegal 
immigration through employer sanctions in defense of domestic workers while also supporting 
legalization programs in the spirit of civil rights advocacy. 
 Concerning political ideology, nearly half of all Conservatives, Moderates, and Liberals 
desired a decrease in immigration levels: 57% of Conservatives, 45% of Moderates, and 48% of 
Liberals.    
 It is also worth noting that all geographic regions of the U.S., other than the Northeast, 
supported a decrease in immigration levels.  
Party platforms 
 
Democratic Party Platforms 
1976 Carter  
 In 1976, just one year prior to Jimmy Carter’s own proposed immigration reform that 
spurred the creation of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, the 
Democratic Party platform continued its “anti-discriminatory” stance that it contended amid the 
1965 immigration reform, vaguely supporting inclusionary legal immigration from all corners of 
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the globe.  However the 1976 platform’s discussion on immigration is brief.  Besides 
encouraging the welcome of political prisoners from other corrupt nations, little is mentioned 
regarding immigration.  The immigration reform that is mentioned is framed within the  “Civil 
and Political Rights” portion, where the platform calls for one of the fundamental aspects of 
Simpson-Mazzoli: a legalization program “to facilitate acquisition of citizenship by Resident 
Aliens.”   
1980 Carter  
 
 Amid the refugee crises from Vietnam, Cuba, and Haiti, the 1980 Democratic Party 
platform thoroughly recognized the Carter administration’s progress in addressing the crises.  
For instance, the Refugee Act of 1980 differentiated the refugee and immigration processes, and 
the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy had been created to evaluate United 
States’ immigration policy.  
 In regard to immigration policy, the platform urged for reform that protected the rights of 
undocumented immigrants and minorities who may be discriminated against due to 
“neighborhood sweeps” or “stop and search procedures without probable cause.”  In addition, the 
platform denounced any guest-workers program that would “undercut U.S. wages and working 
conditions…which would re-establish the bracero program of the past.”  However, an explicit 
mention of a legalization program for “resident aliens,” as seen in the 1976 Democratic Party 
platform, did not appear in the 1980 platform.  Rather, a less specific acknowledgement assured 
that the U.S. “must work to resolve the issue of undocumented residents in a fair and humane 
way.” 
 
1984 Mondale  
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 Immigration policy reform had become more relevant and plausible by 1984, when 
sensitive congressional compromise continued over Simpson-Mazzoli.  At the 1984 Democratic 
Convention the Hispanic Democratic Delegation protested Simpson-Mazzoli’s discriminating 
provisions by threatening to boycott voting on the first ballot for a Presidential candidate.   
 The 1984 Democratic Party platform was very brief in discussing immigration reform.  In 
fact, behind only the 1980 Democratic Party platform, the 1984 platform was the longest in the 
Party’s history, yet it included only a couple sentences concerning immigration.  Most of the 
platform discussed the economy and creating jobs during a period of a globalizing economy.  
The portion that did refer to immigration stuck to the Democrats’ status quo: support for 
accepting political prisoners as refugees and the denouncement of discrimination amid increased 
immigration. 
 The explicit 1976 platform proposal of granting citizenship to “resident aliens” does not 
reappear in the 1984 platform.  In fact, the 1984 platform merely acknowledges the 
discrimination that immigrants face, but does not mention a solution for undocumented 
immigrants residing in the U.S.    
Republican Party Platforms  
 
1976 Ford  
 The 1976 Republican Party platform failed to mention immigration at all.  Rather, the 
platform focused on traditional Republican issues, including “taxes and government spending,” 
“small business,” “a small and just society,” “the American family,” and “welfare reform,” 
among others.  
1980 Reagan  
 In 1980, like the Democratic Party platform, the Republican Party’s platform touched on 
the refugee crises, citing America’s open arms and the coordination that ought to occur with 
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international organizations and governments to solve the refugee crises.  The platform does 
allude to the need for immigration policy reform that “reflects the interests of our national 
security and economic well-being,” although the provisions that would do so remain vague.  The 
platform does allude to an increased dedication to enforcing immigration law, stating, 
“Government has a duty to adopt immigration laws and follow enforcement procedures which 
will fairly and effectively implement the immigration policy desired by the American people.”  
1984 Reagan  
 
 The 1984 Republican Party platform was more straightforward than in 1980.  It directly 
identified illegal immigration as a problem, urging for “responsible reforms of our immigration 
laws…to enable us to regain control of our borders.”  The platform does, however, support 
family reunification.   
Case Analysis 
 
Interest Group Analysis 
 
FAIR 
 FAIR rates “highly restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  It called 
for strict employer sanctions, disapproved of legalization programs, and proposed a 425,000 
annual cap on immigration that included family reunification and refugee acceptance.  
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce rates as “low expansive” on the immigration policy 
preference spectrum.  The Chamber was strongly opposed to employer sanctions, but did support 
guest-worker programs. 
MALDEF  
 MALDEF rates “highly expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  The 
organization stood firmly against employer sanctions’ and guest worker programs’ potentials for 
discrimination, and supported legalization and family reunification programs.  
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NAACP  
 The NAACP rates as “low restrictive,” supporting employer sanctions in support of the 
black domestic worker.  In the same nature, the NAACP stood opposed to guest worker 
programs, but did support legalization programs. 
AFL-CIO 
 The AFL-CIO rates as “low restrictive,” mirroring the NAACP’s support of domestic 
labor.  Like the NAACP, the AFL-CIO supported employer sanctions and legalization programs, 
but opposed proposed guest workers programs.   
 
1984 Party Platform Analysis 
 
Democratic Party 
 The Democratic Party platform rates “low expansive” on the immigration policy 
preference spectrum.  The platform makes little concrete proposals, but does acknowledge 
increased discrimination against immigrants.   
 
Republican Party 
 The Republican Party platform rates “low restrictive” on the immigration policy 
preference spectrum.  Like the Democratic Party platform, this platform fails to propose concrete 
policy.  Yet, it calls to “regain control of the border,” implying increased efforts toward 
immigration law enforcement, effectively restricting overall immigration levels.   
 
Public Opinion Analysis 
 Although the public did seemingly become more aware of immigration as an issue 
(“undecided” respondents to immigration preference surveys decreased from 20% to 9% from 
1965 to 1986), for this study’s purposes, immigration is still not considered salient in the 1984 
election.  Since immigration was not viewed as one of the primary, or even secondary “issues 
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facing the nation” prior to and during the 1984 election, this study will not consider immigration 
as nationally salient.  
Case Conclusion 
 
 In this study’s theoretical model, the relationship between the independent variable 
(interest groups’ immigration policy preferences) and the dependent variable (political party 
platforms) depends on immigration’s salience.  In 1984, immigration was not salient, so we 
would expect for the parties to remain loyal to interest groups, not exclusively the electorate.   
 This case fits somewhat well into Bawn et. al’s theory, which predicts political parties’ 
loyalty to interest groups, especially when political salience is low. However, given the “strange 
bedfellow” coalitions that dominate immigration policy bargaining, parties can’t always take a 
stance that pleases all of their core interest groups.  For example, MALDEF and the NAACP, as 
ethnic advocacy groups, usually take similar policy stances.  However, in regard to IRCA 
proposals, the NAACP’s support for employer sanctions’ protection of domestic black labor 
contrasts with MALDEF’s vehement objection to sanctions’ discriminatory potential.  In effect, 
the Democratic Party struggles to please both ethnic advocacy groups and labor advocates.  
Resembling the same “strange bedfellow” dynamic, liberals and conservatives are often split 
between expansive and restrictive immigration policy preferences. 
 Both Republican and Democratic Parties faced the dilemma of appealing to both sides of 
their interest groups, as well as their electorates.  For Republicans, business, represented by the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce in this study, preferred somewhat expansive immigration policy, 
firmly in opposition to employer sanctions.  Yet, FAIR argues that employer sanctions are the 
bedrock of any immigration policy reform.  For the Republican Party, this split meant remaining 
somewhat neutral on immigration, pleasing FAIR’s restrictive interests by calling for increased 
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enforcement of immigration law, but failing to mention employer sanctions in an effort to 
appease the business community.  
 For Democrats, labor-oriented interest groups, like the AFL-CIO and the NAACP, 
favored employer sanctions’ protection of American jobs.  Yet, MALDEF, one of the most 
visible opponents to Simpson-Mazzoli, opposed employer sanctions due to their discriminatory 
potential.  In response, the Democrats also took a neutral, almost non-stance.  Their platform did 
not call for immigration reform of any kind, although it did acknowledge the prevalence of 
discrimination amid increasing immigration levels.  This position could be interpreted as a 
defense of MALDEF’s discrimination concerns.  Unhappy with the Simpson-Mazzoli proposals 
of employer sanctions and guest worker programs, the Democratic Party simply decided against 
even mentioning past or future attempts of immigration policy reform. 
 Bawn et. al cannot explain the Democratic Party platform’s failure to mention 
legalization provisions, which were supported by labor and all ethnic advocacy groups, including 
the NAACP.  The only explanation within Bawn et. al’s framework is that the Democrats were 
so opposed to Simpson-Mazzoli proposals that even alluding to its progress or provisions would 
undermine MALDEF’s concern with its discriminatory nature.  Democrats do not appear to be 
catering to their electorate’s interests before interest groups’: by 1986, almost 50% of liberals 
desired a decrease in immigration.  
Case #2: 2004 Party Platforms and 2006-2007 Immigration Reform 
 
Narrative 
 
Immigration since 1986 
 Since the 1986 passage of IRCA, some minor immigration legislation was passed 
throughout the 1990’s, but efforts toward comprehensive policy reform had not been made by 
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2004.  The 1990’s legislation included the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which “affected immigrant eligibility for federal social programs, 
increased enforcement efforts, and added [employer] penalties and increased work place 
screenings” (Leal 2, 2009).  Yet, in the 2000’s, the same illegal immigration concerns from the 
1980’s remained, especially concerning the millions of undocumented immigrants already 
residing in the U.S. The number of undocumented immigrants residing in the United States rose 
from 3.2 million in 1986 to approximately 12  million in 2007 (Wasem, 2012). 
 
Figure 6: “Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2014 - Illegal Immigration - ProCon.org.” 
procon.org. http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844 (March 26, 2017). 
 Only a few months into his first term, in July, 2001, President George W. Bush 
foreshadowed his intentions to engage in comprehensive immigration reform efforts, claiming, 
The White House “was considering a task force proposal to allow the estimated 3 million 
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Mexicans living illegally in the United States to achieve permanent legal residence through a 
guest-worker program” (Wallace, 2001).  Although admittedly interested in some sort of 
permanent residence program that avoided deportation provisions, Bush ensured to clarify that 
he was opposed to a “blanket amnesty” program.  9/11 and the Iraq War would later delay any 
federal efforts toward addressing immigration reform, although the programs that the Bush 
administration alluded to foreshadowed the bargaining stalemate that would occur throughout 
Bush’s second term.  
Initial proposals 
 After the 2004 elections, Republicans controlled the Senate, House, and Presidency.  
However, throughout their term in control, divisions within the Republican Party stalled 
immigration reform efforts.  In the House, Republicans most sought enhanced border security, as 
well as the inclusion of a guest workers program.  The Senate agreed, although they urged for a 
legalization program as well.  Yet, the Republican divisions that thwarted policy progress were 
not between the two chambers, but rather between “the business community and grassroots 
social conservatives” (Leal 3, 2009).   
 As in the past, the business community pushed for cheap, accessible immigrant labor, 
especially in the agricultural sector.  To protect their interests, business lobbied for an extensive 
guest-worker program and policy provisions that allowed undocumented immigrants already 
residing in the U.S. to remain.  Social conservatives were more concerned with the integrity and 
enforcement of U.S. immigration laws and the preservation of traditional American culture.  
They perceived undocumented immigrants to be criminals and policies permitting their 
employment, residence, or eventual citizenship were undermining the law and threatening 
American culture and national security.  
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 The first proposed legislation came from the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, 
James Sensenbrenner (R-WI).  This bill included severe restrictive provisions, including the 
criminalization of “illegal presence” in the U.S., which constituted a 366-day jail term.  The bill 
also mandated employers’ usage of a “Basic Pilot” program to verify employees’ legal statuses, 
and criminalized anyone “offering services or assistance to illegal immigrants, ” which Hillary 
Clinton then claimed would send “even Jesus himself” to prison (Leal 3, 2009).   The bill met 
passionate opposition from immigrants and college students, who protested the bill’s restrictive 
nature. 
 Having desired a less restrictive, more comprehensive reform, the Senate’s proposals 
contrasted from the House’s.  Three proposals were presented to the Senate in 2006 prior to an 
eventual compromise: one from Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Arlen Specter (R-PA), 
another from Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and John McCain (R-AZ), and one from Senate 
Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) (Leal 4, 2009).  Frist’s bill mirrored the House’s enforcement 
heavy proposal, excluding guest worker or legalization programs.  He warned Specter, Kennedy, 
and McCain that if they couldn’t come to a compromise on their less restrictive proposals, then 
only his bill would be brought to the Senate floor.    Frist’s pressure motivated compromise 
between the Senators, who then needed a supermajority of the Senate’s support to pass their 
compromise.   
 The Judiciary Committee’s compromise was passed 12-6; “all eight Democrats and four 
of the ten Republicans voted yes” (Leal 5, 2009).  It included a guest worker program admitting 
400,000 annually, Green Card eligibility for agricultural workers, increased border enforcement 
measures, and possible legalization for immigrants who had arrived prior to 2004 and had 
completed 11 years of arduous assimilation steps, including learning English.  The most 
	 	 71	
contentious provision was the legalization program, which opposing Republicans deemed 
“amnesty.”  Ultimately, the compromise couldn’t attract enough Republican support in the 
Senate. 
 Striving to achieve support for comprehensive reform, Senators Chuck Hagel (R-NE) and 
Mel Martinez (R-FL) added heavily stringent components to the legalization program in hopes of 
attracting Republican support.  One provision required those who had resided in the United 
States for between five and two years (about three million)…would have had to return to their 
nations of origin before applying for a visa,” while those who had resided in the U.S. for less 
than two years would have been deported (Leal 5, 2009).  However, adequate support did not 
present itself in the Senate. 
 With encouragement from the Bush administration to reach comprehensive immigration 
reform, Frist and Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) tweaked the Hagel-Martinez 
compromise, passing the Senate 62-36 (22 Republicans for and 32 against, 39 Democrats for and 
4 against) on May 24th (United States Senate).  Despite the Senate’s ability to pass a 
comprehensive reform bill, the House’s restrictive policy preferences made a conference 
committee’s potential seem bleak—it never happened.  The majority-Republican House elected 
to host hearings on immigration reform rather than appoint compromise conferees, killing reform 
effort’s momentum.  As mid-term elections approached and the potential for compromise 
dwindled away, “Senate Democrats charged that House Republicans wanted to use immigration 
as a campaign issue and were not serious about finding solutions”  (Leal 6, 2009).  Yet, members 
of both the House and Senate hoped to exemplify their concern with the problem of illegal 
immigration—especially before the midterm elections—leading to The Border Security First 
Act. 
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 As the only immigration bill to pass in 2006, The Border Security First Act did not 
accomplish comprehensive immigration reform.  Rather, it enacted the construction of 700 miles 
of fencing on the US-Mexico border.  The bill passed easily in both chambers with unified 
Republican support and divided Democratic support: 283-138 in the House (Democrats against 
64-131 and Republicans for 219-6), 80-19 in the Senate (26 Democrats for, 56 Republicans for).   
Democrats Gain Control in 2006 
 
 After the Republican-controlled congress failed to pass comprehensive immigration 
reform from 2004 to 2006, the potential for comprehensive reform resurfaced as Democrats took 
control of the House and Senate in the 2006 midterm election.  With trouble, the Senate was the 
first to attempt passing a compromise.   
 The Senate’s proposal featured a mix of restrictive and expansive provisions, but was 
ultimately more expansive than the Frist-Reid bill.  The most expansive provision was unseen in 
past bargaining efforts; the Z visa “would legalize almost all unauthorized immigrants” (Leal 7, 
2009).  Although, the Z visa relied on the inclusion of several restrictive provisions: criminal 
liability for employers of the undocumented, employers’ use of the “Basic Pilot” employee 
screening system, no citizenship for guest workers, and restrictive family reunification processes.  
The first Senate proposal was unable to gain enough support for passage, leading to the inclusion 
of a provision “to commit $4.4 billion for security and enforcement efforts” (Leal 7, 1990).   
 In June of 2007, after numerous attempts at compromise and revision, the Senate’s 
compromise failed to pass cloture, needing 60 votes, but receiving only 46 (Democrats 16 
against, 37 Republicans against). Lacking support derived from Republicans’ concern about 
appearing inconsistent if they switched their votes from “no” in 2006 to “yes” in 2007, their fear 
of a Democrat-led compromise committee with the House, and their rejection of the Z visa’s 
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generous citizenship provision (Leal 7, 2009).  This legislative failure ultimately killed the Bush 
administration’s hopes for comprehensive reform.   
Public Opinion 
 
The National Attitude Toward Immigration Levels 
 In general, the national attitude toward immigration in 2004 resembles that of 1986.  The 
nation was approximately split in half between those supporting present or increased levels and 
those supporting decreased levels of immigration.  In 1986, 35% of respondents desired the 
maintenance of the present immigration levels, 7% hoped for an increase, and 49% wanted a 
decrease, while 9% held no opinion.  In 2004, 33% supported the present level, 14% an increased 
level, and 49% a decreased level, while 4% had no opinion.  Although the national attitudes 
toward immigration seem virtually identical between 1986 and 2004 responses, they did not 
remain completely stable across their near two-decade gap. 
 Between 1986 and 2004, national attitudes toward immigration shifted toward restrictive 
positions during the 1990’s.  In 1995, 27% of respondents supported the present level of 
immigration (down 8% from ’86), 7% desired an increase (same as ’86), and 62% preferred a 
decrease (up 13% from ’86), while 4% did not hold an opinion.  The enforcement-heavy policies 
passed throughout the 1990’s, predominately under Bill Clinton, echoed this shift toward 
restrictive immigration preferences.  Yet, by the 2000’s, attitudes toward immigration rebounded 
toward the less restrictive 1986 positions; in June of 2001 those preferring the present 
immigration level (42%) actually out numbered those in favor of decreased levels (41%), while 
14% favored increased levels.   
 The 9/11 attacks halted and reversed this shift toward expansive immigration attitudes.  
From June 2001 to October 2001, respondents’ attitudes abruptly shifted toward restrictive 
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positions; those supporting present immigration levels fell by 12% to 30%, those for increased 
immigration fell by 6% to 8% and those seeking decreased levels grew by 17% to 58%.  In the 
decade following 9/11, attitudes would gradually return to pre-9/11 levels, resembling those of 
1986.
 
 
Figure 7: “Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2014 - Illegal Immigration - ProCon.org.” 
procon.org. http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844 (March 26, 2017). 
Illegal Immigration 
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 Although the nation’s public was essentially split on immigration level preferences in 
2004, it achieved consensus concerning illegal immigration: it was a problem in need of a 
solution.  In 2006, 81% characterized illegal immigration as “out of control” (Connelly, 2006).  
However, the public was very divided in opinion regarding workable solutions to illegal 
immigration’s spike.   
 The American public’s policy preferences split concerning how reform generally ought to 
address the approximately 12 million undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S.: 32% 
preferred allowing permanent residency, 32% preferred allowing residency under a guest worker 
program, and 27% preferred deportation to undocumented immigrants’ home countries (Ilias et. 
al 745, 2008). 
Talk Radio  
 Although the nation as a whole agreed that illegal immigration was a problem that needed 
to be solved, it became a higher priority than most for far-right social conservatives.  This subset 
of voters’ prioritization of suppressing illegal immigration is evident in the rise of conservative 
talk radio.   
 In regard to illegal immigration, conservative talk radio took an extremely restrictive 
stance, even “denouncing Republican President George W. Bush’s work-permit proposals as 
‘amnesty for law-breakers’” (Leal 9, 2009).  In 2008, discussing the illegal immigrations’ 
negative effects made up a significant portion of talk radio’s content: 19% of airtime compared 
to mainstream media’s 9%.  Those discussions “directed intensity toward members of both 
parties,” expressing their outrage with the “’’invasion’ of foreigners flooding across ‘porous’ US 
border in flagrant violation of the law” (Leal 9, 2009).  Given the intensity and frequency of talk 
radio’s illegal immigration coverage compared to the mainstream media’s, it is no surprise that 
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reform opponents tied their votes closely with their views on immigration; “a CNN poll found 
that 43 per cent of reform opponents said the immigration issue would be ‘very important’ to 
their vote in 2006, the corresponding figure for reform supporters was 24 per cent” (Leal 9, 
2009). 
 Conservative talk radio, its listeners, and legislators responding to their restrictive policy 
preferences are credited for preventing comprehensive immigration reform.  Talk radio became 
“an advocacy machine…that long buttressed Republican efforts to defeat Democrats and their 
policies” (Leal 9, 2009).  In the case of immigration reform, this advocacy machine’s efforts also 
directed pressure toward moderate Republicans willing to compromise with Democrats.  
The Nation’s Most Important Problems  
 From 1996 to 2004, exit polls asked voters, “What do you think is the most important 
problem facing this country?”  During this timespan, neither immigration, nor illegal 
immigration appeared in the top five reported responses.  Overshadowed by issues like the war in 
Iraq, crime, the economy, gas prices, and unemployment, immigration did not take center stage 
leading up to these presidential elections. 
Interest Group Policy Preferences  
 
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) 
 
 Due to their stern opposition to amnesty, FAIR criticized comprehensive immigration 
reform efforts throughout 2006 and 2007.  Aside from pathways to citizenship, which FAIR 
undoubtedly opposed as “amnesty,” the group was also dismayed with the idea of a guest 
workers program, especially one allowing permanent residency or applications for citizenship.  
FAIR argued that guest workers programs were only beneficial due to the cheap, exploitable 
labor they provided for American business, but “once immigrants receive permanent residence, 
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they can’t be exploited as readily as illegal immigrants.”  Furthermore, for FAIR, such a guest 
worker program would invite illegal immigrants, which FAIR identified as the source of 
“enormous, incalculable costs imposed on society at large—public education, emergency 
medical care, housing assistance, housing itself and criminal justice costs” (Katel, 2005). 
 Foreshadowing the congressional gridlock that would plague comprehensive immigration 
reform efforts, especially within the Republican Party, FAIR ensured that their policy 
preferences reflected those of “the average American voter” (Katel, 2005).  Then President of 
FAIR, Dan Stein framed the debate between “elites, major financial interests and global 
economic forces arrayed against the average American voter, warning, “the depth of anger 
should not be underestimated” (Katel, 2005).  These remarks are telling given many far right 
Republicans’ hesitancy to support any immigration reform with provisions resembling amnesty.   
 FAIR’s place in the Republican Party’s base has not always been central, but as illegal 
immigration became an increasingly important issue for far-right social conservatives, FAIR’s 
perspectives became more foundational in Republican policy stances.   
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
 
 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce backed comprehensive immigration reform efforts, 
especially those proposing “the expansion of temporary visa programs for essential workers, 
while ensuring that temporary workers would not take jobs being filled by U.S. citizens” 
(Rosenblum, 2007).  The Chamber of Commerce was concerned with any increased bureaucracy 
at borders that would “impede the movement of legitimate cargo and travelers” (Rosenblum, 
2007).   
 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) 
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 MALDEF supported comprehensive immigration reform efforts, lobbying for a 
pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S., permanent 
residency for participants in temporary guest workers programs, family reunification, 
immigrants’ due process rights, and the DREAM Act, which proposed to grant citizenship to 
children who were brought illegally to America if they completed two years of college or 
military service.  Although, MALDEF did oppose increased border patrol that was included 
throughout comprehensive reform efforts, claiming, “the continuous buildup of forces along 
the border has done little to curb unlawful immigration” (United States, 2007).  
AFL-CIO 
 
 The AFL-CIO opposed comprehensive reform efforts that proposed increased 
temporary guest workers programs, claiming “workers here on a temporary basis are more 
vulnerable to labor violations…some temporary workers will stay in this country illegally 
rather than go home when their visa expires” (Rosenblum, 2007).  Although hesitant to 
support a guest workers program due to the potential to undercut domestic laborers, at 
minimum, the AFL-CIO desired guaranteed permanent residency or a path to citizenship for 
guest workers.    
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
 The NAACP stood somewhere between MALDEF and the AFL-CIO, siding with 
MALDEF as a civil rights organization and with the AFL-CIO as an advocate for black 
domestic labor.  Though, in the debate on immigration, the NAACP stood alongside 
MALDEF as fellow members of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR), a 
coalition of civil rights organizations.  The LCCR submitted a detailed explanation of the 
“complicated relationship between the African-American community and immigrant 
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communities” to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border 
Security, and International Law (United States, 2007).  The explanation detailed LCCR’s 
concern with immigration’s effect on African-Americans’ employment levels, especially in 
unskilled positions.  Yet, LCCR also notes that although advocates of restrictive immigration 
policy often claim to protect the African-American laborer, the same advocates of restrictive 
immigration policy “inconsistently show their concern for the welfare of African American 
on the whole,” citing their opposition to the Voting Rights Act’s reauthorization.  In fact, 
LCCR states, “it is clear that immigration restrictionists are not—and never have been—our 
friends” (United States, 2007). 
 Ultimately, the NAACP sides with MALDEF more than the AFL-CIO, standing with 
the LCCR’s support for “more open vacancy notification systems…to fill low-wage jobs,” 
while ensuring “strong labor, health, wage and safety protections, and there must be an 
opportunity for such workers to become legal permanent residents and get on a path to 
citizenship” (United States, 2007). 
Party Platforms 
 
Democrats 
1996 Clinton 
 In response to concerns over illegal immigration, the 1996 Democratic Party Platform 
called for a continued increase in border patrol and an increase in the criminal and civil 
punishments for employers of undocumented immigrants.  Plus, the platform opposed eligibility 
for undocumented immigrants in welfare programs, accompanying the Republican Party in 
assigning financial responsibility for immigrants to their sponsors.   However, in opposition to 
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Congressional Republican sentiment, the platform did explicitly support the right to education 
for U.S. born undocumented children.   
 Regarding legal immigration, the Democrats call for continued efforts with the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) toward “streamlining procedures, cutting red tape, 
and using new technology to make it easier for legal immigrants to accept the responsibilities of 
citizenship and truly call America their home” (“Political Party Platforms,” 2016).  
 It is also worth noting that although this platform urged “everyone in America to learn 
English so they can fully share in our daily life,” it “strongly opposed divisive efforts like 
English-only legislation, designed to erect barriers between us and force people away from the 
culture and heritage of which they are rightly proud.” 
2000 Gore 
 The 2000 Democratic Party Platform shares the 1996 platform’s solution to illegal 
immigration: improved border patrol and stringent employer sanctions.   
 In regard to legal immigration, this platform calls for an increasingly efficient citizenship 
application screening process, a focus on family reunification, and guest workers programs 
guaranteeing the workers’ protection.  The proposed guest worker programs aim to “address only 
genuine shortages of highly skilled workers” and to “assure an adequate, predictable supply of 
agricultural labor while protecting American farm workers who are among the poorest and more 
vulnerable in our society” (“Party Platforms,” 2016).   Explicit language is included denouncing 
“guest worker programs that lead to exploitation” of labor, additionally advocating for the 
“adjusted status of immigrants with deep roots in the country.”  In addition to this legal 
immigration platform, a sense of cultural assimilation is expected from legal immigrants, which 
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is reflected in the Democrats’ support for resources directed toward English language learning 
courses for “newcomers.”  
 2004 Kerry 
 To address illegal immigration, the 2004 Democratic Party platform focuses on increased 
border patrol and paths to citizenship.  The platform fails to mention employer sanctions, but 
includes improved border patrol as a matter of “strengthening homeland security.”  Regarding 
the 7 million undocumented immigrants estimated to have been residing in U.S., this platform 
argues for earned citizenship: “undocumented immigrant within our borders who clear a background 
check, work hard and pay taxes should have a path to earn full participation in America” (Frieden, 2003).   
 In addressing legal immigration, aside from supporting paths to citizenship for 
undocumented residents, the platform backed family reunification for parents, children, and 
spouses, as well as cultural assimilation efforts including English-language and civic education 
programs.   
 The 2004 platform does not mention a guest workers program, but the previously cited 
statement supporting citizenship for working, tax paying, and non-criminal undocumented 
immigrants seemingly applies to any potential guest workers as well.   
Republican Party Platforms 
 1996 Dole 
 To thwart illegal immigration, the 1996 Republican Party platform stresses the need to 
“increase border patrol, accelerate deportation of criminal aliens, toughen penalties for 
overstaying visas, and streamline the Immigration and Naturalization Service” (“Party 
Platforms,” 2016).  Plus, the platform explicitly cites Republican opposition to undocumented 
immigrants’ use of “expensive welfare programs” and their support for Proposition 187 in 
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California, which aimed to “bar illegal immigrants and their children from receiving government 
services like a public education” (Nieves, 1999).  More radically, the platform urges for a 
constitutional amendment that would reject automatic citizenship for “children born in the 
United States of parents who are not legally present in the United States or who are not long-
term residents” (“Party Platform,” 2016).   
 In a stringently restrictive nature, this platform objects to legal immigrants receiving 
public aid, assigning the responsibility of immigrants’ “financial well-being” to the immigrants’ 
sponsors.  The platform likens sponsors to “deadbeat dads” who “must provide for the children 
they bring into this world”: “deadbeat sponsors” ought “provide for the immigrants they brought 
into this country” (“Party Platform,” 2016). 
  2000 George W. Bush 
 In addressing illegal immigration, the 2000 Republican Party platform cites economic 
development in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean as the long-term solution, but 
increased border patrol as the short-term solution, especially targeting smugglers and producers 
of fake documents.  The platform endorsed the recommendations of the U.S. Commission of 
Immigration Reform, including increased border patrol, refined family reunification guidelines 
that limit extended relatives’ eligibility, and reform of labor certification programs to increase 
employers’ access to qualified foreign workers. 
 The 2000 platform is undoubtedly in support of expanding guest workers programs, 
although without mention of participants’ pathway to citizenship.  The platform supported the 
expansion of both H-1B and H-2 visas, ensuring available labor in both high-tech, specialized 
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positions and “urgent” agricultural work.  In describing these programs, the platform explicitly 
refers to these workers as “temporary,” implying they would not eventually gain citizenship. 
 2004 George W. Bush 
 The 2004 Republican Party platform provides thorough and specific solutions to the 
problem of illegal immigration.  Framed as an issue of national security, the predominant 
component of the platform’s solution is increased border patrol, including “reconnaissance 
cameras, border patrol agents, unmanned aerial flights,” and the US-VISIT bio-metric data 
system, which tracks the entry and exit of foreign travelers at airports and land border crossings.  
Another aspect of intensified border patrol is the platform’s support of “Border Patrol agents’ 
ability to deport illegal aliens without having first to go through the cumbersome process of 
allowing the illegal alien to have a hearing before an immigration judge” (“Party Platforms,” 
2016).  The platform also calls for “tough penalties” on employers of undocumented immigrants, 
while denouncing amnesty as encouraging future illegal immigration. 
 This platform endorses President Bush’s “new temporary worker program that applies 
when no Americans can be found to fill the jobs.”  The guest worker program would allow the 
participation of present undocumented immigrants and would provide them with an opportunity 
to apply for legal citizenship. 
Case Analysis 
Interest Group Analysis 
FAIR  
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 FAIR rates “high restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  FAIR 
represented the far-right portion of the Republican Party, strongly opposing amnesty and also 
any guest workers program conceding permanent residency.  
U.S. Chamber of Commerce  
 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce rates “low expansive” on the immigration policy 
preference spectrum.  They do support guest workers programs, especially when employment 
opportunities cannot be filled with domestic labor.  However, a pathway to citizenship is much 
less important to the Chamber than a steady stream of adequate labor for business. 
MALDEF  
 MALDEF rates “high expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  In 
comprehensive reform, they lobby against increased border patrol and in support of pathways to 
citizenship, as well as a guest workers program complete with provisions allowing permanent 
residence or citizenship.  
NAACP  
 NAACP rates as “low expansive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  Torn 
between protecting African-American labor and immigrants’ civil rights, NAACP’s membership 
in the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights displays their distrust of immigration 
restrictionists.  They reluctantly support a guest workers program, but only under the 
circumstances that immigrant labor is protected and granted a pathway to permanent residency. 
AFL-CIO  
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 The AFL-CIO rates as “low restrictive” on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  
Labor’s protection of domestic workers motivates their opposition to guest workers programs, 
especially given the possibility that temporary workers may overstay their visas, becoming 
exploitable labor that could undercut domestic laborers.   
2004 Party Platform Analysis 
Democratic Party 
 The Democratic Party platform rates “high expansive.”  The platform’s sole restrictive 
quality is found in the vague and brief mention of improved border security, which is framed as a 
national security issue.  Concerning improved border security, the platform states, “we will work 
with our neighbors to strengthen our security so we are safer from those who would come here to 
harm us” (Presidential Platforms, 2016).  Restrictive provisions that were included in the 1996 
and 2000 platforms are left out in the 2004 Democratic Party platform, including provisions for 
employer sanctions and those denying welfare benefits for undocumented immigrants. 
 The most expansive portion of the platform is the provision for earned citizenship for 
working, tax paying, and non-criminal undocumented immigrants.  This is a very inclusive 
stance considering the 7 million estimated undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S.  
The platform additionally promotes family reunification efforts.   
 In defense of this platform’s “high expansive” rating, it should be noted that the vague 
provisions for heightened border security is significantly less essential to the platform’s 
characterization than the more concrete provisions for an earned pathway to citizenship.   
Republican Party 
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 The Republican Party platform is rated “high restrictive.”   Its restrictive qualities include 
its support for increases to border patrol, including heightened technological resources and 
accelerated deportation capabilities, as well as its firm opposition against amnesty.  Specific 
technological improvements to border patrol are mentioned within the platform, including 
cameras, drones, and a bio-metric data system.  Regarding deportation efforts, the platform aims 
to suspend habeas corpus for undocumented immigrants, relieving U.S. border patrol’s 
obligation to send undocumented immigrants through immigration courts prior to deportation.  
The platform also supports stricter penalties for employers of undocumented immigrants, 
smugglers of undocumented immigrants, and producers of fraudulent identification documents.   
 Although provisions concerning undocumented immigrants’ restricted access to public 
benefits did not appear in the 2000 platform, due to the radical nature of the 1996 proposals it is 
worth mentioning that the 2004 platform also leaves out the extremely restrictive provisions that 
were included in the 1996 platform. 
 The 2004 platform includes few expansive qualities.  Although, relative to previous 
platforms, the guest workers program included in the platform is more expansive.  The program 
is standard in that foreign guest workers would only temporarily work and reside in the U.S.  
However, the program also permitted undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S. to 
participate.  Those participants would be eligible to submit an application for citizenship.    Yet, 
this expansive provision is negligible in comparison to the extent of restrictive proposals riddled 
throughout the platform.   
Public Opinion Analysis 
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 For this study’s purposes, given polling data’s evaluation of the public’s perceived “most 
important problem facing the nation,” neither immigration, nor illegal immigration will be 
considered salient, at least at a national scale.  However, for the portion of socially conservative 
Republicans, often conservative talk radio listeners, the issue of illegal immigration was 
undoubtedly salient.  
Case Conclusion 
 In examining the relationship between the independent variable (interest groups’ 
immigration policy preferences) and the dependent variable (political party platforms), this study 
must first consider public opinion concerning immigration.  In the case of 2004, immigration is 
not considered salient, so we would expect the parties to remain loyal to interest groups’ policy 
preferences.  It is important to note, however, that immigration was found to be salient within a 
far-right socially conservative portion of the Republican Party.  Given this exception, we would 
not consider the model flawed if the Republican Party is found to cater to the socially 
conservative portion of their electorate with which immigration became salient.    
 Bawn’s theory of political parties, which expects political parties to promote the policy 
preferences of core interest groups in times of low political salience, applies well to the 2004 
party platforms and the corresponding interest group policy preferences.     
 For Democrats, their platform toes a fine line in adhering to the interests of both civil 
rights organizations and labor.  The Democratic Party platform is rated “high expansive” as it 
proposed a pathway to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S. who 
“clear background checks, work hard, and pay taxes.”   The platform also mentions the party’s 
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commitment to family reunification efforts.  These proposals align well with the policy 
preferences of MALDEF and the NAACP, the civil rights organizations in this study.  
 The Democratic Party platform also makes an effort to please labor’s interests.  Although 
the AFL-CIO rates “low restrictive” in this case, the Democratic Party platform pays attention to 
labor’s concerns with proposed immigration reform.  But labor’s main concern is the 
implementation of a guest workers program that would exploit undocumented immigrants’ labor 
(especially if workers overstay their visas), simultaneously undermining American citizens’ 
employment.  However, the Democratic Party platform fails to mention a guest workers 
program.  The only mention of immigrant employment is the platform’s call for a path to 
citizenship for those that work hard—a provision that labor would support, given that a path to 
citizenship protects laborers from exploitation and undercutting wages of citizens. 
 The Republican Party platform also aims to appease two relatively contradictory 
interests: business and immigration restrictionists.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
representative of American business interests in this study, desires a guest workers program that 
provides a steady source of labor for American businesses, while opposing employer 
sanctioning.  The platform finds no trouble in catering to business’s desire for a guest workers 
program, as President Bush proposed a temporary worker program in 2004.  However, the 
platform does endorse stringent employer sanctions, which the Chamber of Commerce firmly 
opposes.  The Republican Party’s decision to favor restrictionist policy over business interests 
gives light to their recognition of immigration’s salience within their far right, socially 
conservative supporters.   
	 	 89	
 In Bawn et. al’s model, when an issue becomes salient, the “electoral blindspot” 
decreases in size,  meaning the electorate is more attentive to candidates’ positions, effectively 
forcing parties to shift toward appeasing their electorate rather than their core interest groups.  
For the Republican Party in 2004, the “electoral blindspot” shrunk surrounding the issue of 
immigration, causing the party to serve their core electorate before considering business’s 
interests.  The decreased size of the “electoral blindspot” was due to far-right social 
conservatives’ heightened attentiveness to immigration, especially illegal immigration.  As 
mentioned previously in the “public opinion” section, talk radio programs fueled the far-right 
social conservatives’ outrage against proposals of “amnesty” and in support of increased border 
security proposals.   This resulted in a Republican platform rich with restrictive measures closely 
aligned to the interests of FAIR, including various methods of intensifying border patrol, 
deportation, and a stated opposition to amnesty. Bawn et. al’s model fits in this instance, 
explaining the Republican Party platform’s favor of FAIR’s policy preferences over business’s 
as an effort to chase votes amid amplified political salience, not as the party serving one interest 
group over another.   
Case Study #3: 2016 Party Platforms 
Narrative 
 Following the failed comprehensive immigration reform efforts of 2006 and 2007, 
Obama boldly announced his intention to achieve comprehensive reform within his first year as 
President.  Immigration reform had become a political hot potato in the previous term, especially 
within the socially conservative right wing of the Republican Party, which staunchly opposed 
“amnesty” provisions that were perceived as “gifts” of citizenship to criminal trespassers.  Yet, 
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in the 2008 Presidential campaign, Obama boasted about his Senatorial record as a persistent 
supporter of immigration reform, helping him earn 67% of the Hispanic vote (Lopez, 2008).  
Despite his electoral support, Obama’s immigration reform attempts resembled those of the past: 
plagued with congressional gridlock. 
 Obama’s promise to achieve immigration reform within his first year went unfulfilled, 
without visible progress.  In fact, “the administration sought to prove it was tough on illegal 
immigration by ratcheting up deportations” (Ball, 2014).  At last, in 2010, the Dream Act was 
presented to Congress.  Although not comprehensive reform, The Dream Act hoped “to permit 
young people brought illegally into the U.S. by their parents the opportunity for 
citizenship…contingent on them completing two years of college or military service” (Brandt, 
2010).  After passing the House 216-198 (Democrats 208 for and 38 against, Republicans 8 for 
and 160 against), Senate Democrats failed to get the 60 votes necessary to pass the Dream Act 
with a supermajority (55-41, Democrats 50 for and 5 against, Republicans 36 against and 3 for), 
effectively killing the bill’s congressional life amid a Tea Party congressional take-over in the 
2010 mid-term election.   
 In response to the Dream Act’s congressional failure and the inability to work with an 
increasingly conservative Republican congress, Obama took matters into his own hands in June 
2012, issuing an executive order, referred to as the Consideration of Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) to “stop deporting young illegal immigrants who entered the United 
States as children if they meet certain requirements” (Cohen, 2012).  The order additionally 
instituted an opportunity for eligible individuals to apply for a work visa, but did not include a 
path to citizenship.  Following the highest number of annual U.S. Immigration and Customs 
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Enforcement (ICE) deportations in history and the administration’s failure to meet its promise of 
immigration reform in its first year, Obama’s order aimed to appease Hispanic dissatisfaction.  
Many Congressional Republicans were up in arms over what they perceived to be an “unlawful 
and unconstitutional policy,” as well as a political move to attract Hispanic votes only months 
prior to the 2012 presidential election (Cohen, 2012).   
 Obama’s executive order proved well received from Hispanics, as he earned 71% of the 
Hispanic vote in his 2012 re-election, the largest share since 1996 (Lopez and Taylor, 2012).  
However, Janet Marguía, President of The National Council of La Raza, a high-profile Mexican-
American rights advocacy group, didn’t forget the Obama administration’s increased deportation 
rates and its failure to deliver comprehensive immigration reform after hopeful campaign 
promises; she referred to Obama as the “deporter-in-chief” (Ball, 2014).  After Obama’s 2012 re-
election, comprehensive immigration reform efforts continued, but the trend of congressional 
gridlock sustained. 
 Republicans cited immigration as an issue that may have cost them the 2012 Presidential 
election.  To regain lost ground, with support from the business community and a large share of 
their party base, Republicans were eager to exhibit their concern with illegal immigration.  In 
their 2012 autopsy concerning their 2012 presidential election loss, the Republican Party 
admitted, “among the steps Republicans take in the Hispanic community and beyond, we must 
embrace and champion comprehensive immigration reform”, fearing, “if we do not, our Party's 
appeal will continue to shrink to its core constituencies only” (Franke-Ruta 2013).  In 2013, a 
bipartisan group of eight Senators, including Chuck Schumer (D-NY), Bob Menendez (D-NJ), 
Dick Durbin (D-Ill), Michael Bennet (D-Colo), Marco Rubio (R-Fla), John McCain (R-AZ), and 
	 	 92	
Lindsey Graham (R-SC), created an immigration proposal.  The proposal was truly a 
compromise, aiming to “clear the way for millions of undocumented residents to have a chance 
at citizenship, attract workers from all over the world and devote unprecedented resources for 
security along the US-Mexico border” (Min Kim, 2013).  The proposal passed the Senate with 
room to spare (68-32, all 52 Democrats in favor, 14 Republicans in favor, 32 against) (“S. 744,”).  
With 14 Republican Senators willing to compromise, comprehensive immigration reform 
seemed incredibly plausible.  Yet, conservative House Republicans proved less willing to 
compromise than those in the Senate, exposing a growing divide between the Republican Party’s 
establishment and the Tea Party.   
  In the midst of a “fight for the soul” of the Republican Party, immigration compromise 
was an opportunity for the far-right Tea Party to make a case for its “angry, oppositionist, 
populist strain” of the GOP against moderate mainstream “pragmatists” (Ball, 2013).  Indeed, 
socially conservative Republicans, along with moderates weary of the political risk of 
immigration reform including amnesty provisions, pressured House Speaker John Boehner (R-
OH) to deny the possibility of a compromise with the Senate’s proposal.  Ultimately, Boehner 
defended the House’s refusal to advance with immigration reform by expressing their distrust for 
the administration’s execution of the law, citing overreaching executive orders as threatening to 
any potential immigration reform.  By early 2014, the possibility for comprehensive reform had 
again withered. 
 Amid a spike in the number of unaccompanied, undocumented children arriving at the 
United States’ southern border, the immigration process seemed more in need of reform than 
ever (Park, 2014).  Like Obama’s disappointing first year in office without immigration reform, 
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he again failed to deliver on his promises for reform throughout the summer of 2014, blaming 
“Republicans’ extreme politicization of the issue” as “harmful to the long-term prospects for 
comprehensive immigration reform” (Ball, 2014).  Without the ability to compromise with 
Congress on comprehensive reform, Obama again pledged to act himself.   Yet, concerned with 
numerous red state Democratic Senators’ chances in the mid-term elections, the Obama 
administration decided to delay any executive action until after November of 2014.   
 In late November of 2014, after Republicans gained control of the Senate and retained 
control of the House in the midterm elections, Obama presented numerous executive orders 
aiming to expand his previous executive action on immigration. The orders aimed to “grant up to 
five million unauthorized immigrants protection from deportation, expand Obama’s 2012 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, and enact Deferred Action for 
Parental Accountability (DAPA), a deferral program allowing approximately 4 million 
undocumented parents of American citizens or legal permanent residents to avoid deportation” 
(Parlapiano, 2014).  Yet, this time, the courts challenged Obama’s use executive power.  In 
February of 2015, “a federal judge in Texas halted Obama’s executive orders on immigration,” 
citing an inadequate understanding of the public’s opinion on the order (Greenblatt, 2015).  
Republicans applauded the continuation of deportations and the check on Obama’s executive 
powers.  By June 2016, a 4-4 tie in the Supreme Court upheld the Texas ruling, ultimately 
concluding Obama’s mostly failed efforts at immigration reform (Liptak and Shear, 2016). 
 In 2015 and 2016, both parties’ eventual Presidential candidates established their 
immigration stances.  Most notably, Donald Trump announced his candidacy in June, 2015, 
“with a pledge to build a ‘great wall’ on the Mexican border,” build a “massive deportation 
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force,” and “humanely” deport 11 million undocumented immigrants (LoBianco, 2015; Lyons, 
2016).  Trump faced fierce opposition from fellow Republican candidates like Jeb Bush and John 
Kasich, who referred to Trump’s proposals as “a silly argument.”  In contrast, Democratic Party 
candidates Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders “promised to integrate legal immigrants and help 
more gain citizenship while ending deportations” (Lyons, 2016).  Aside from concerns regarding 
illegal immigration from Mexico and Central America, numerous terror attacks spurred debate 
regarding the national security implications of immigration policy.   
 Throughout 2015 and 2016, several high-profile terror attacks, coupled with a Syrian 
refugee crisis,  “prompted fear in the United States about terrorists slipping into the country by 
posing as Syrian refugees” (Lyons, 2016).  Public officials responded in various ways, including 
Congress’s reaction to a shooting of 36 by a Pakistani visa-holder in San Bernardino, California: 
passage of “legislation requiring those with dual citizenship in Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Syria to 
apply for a visa for temporary visits to the U.S.” (Lyons, 2016).  This legislation was passed with 
overwhelming support (497 to 19), preventing “those who have visited those countries in the last 
five years, from traveling to the United States without a visa” (Edwards, 2015).  In the week 
following the San Bernardino attack, Trump proposed a highly contentious plan: “a total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can 
figure out what is going on” (Vitali, 2016).  The acceptance of refugees and the protection of 
Americans from terrorism became central issues throughout the 2016 presidential election.   
 In a surprising upset, Donald Trump won the Presidential election in November of 2016, 
claiming to be the “law and order candidate.”  By January 27th, one week into the Trump 
presidency, an executive order was signed “that promised to keep ‘radical Islamic terrorists out 
of the United States of America’” (McGraw and Kelsey, 2016).  The order “took immediate 
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effect to bar admission to the U.S. of all people with non-immigrant or immigrant visas from 
seven countries—Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen—for 90 days.”  The order 
also included “an indefinite ban on refugees from war-torn Syria” (McGraw and Kelsey, 2016).  
All of the countries included in the executive order were Muslim-majority nations, leading many 
critics to cite the order’s intent to ban Muslims, as Trump had claimed he would during his 
Presidential campaign.  The order was met with massive protests at airports in response to the 
hundreds of refugees and immigrants being held upon arrival across the nation, “caught in 
communications limbo between the White House and the Department of Homeland Security—” 
(McGraw and Kelsey, 2016).  The Washington state Attorney General filed a lawsuit in a U.S. 
District Court, ultimately leading to the Ninth Circuit court’s unanimous decision to disapprove 
of the order, citing Trump’s previous promises to implement a Muslim travel ban and an absence 
of evidence that supported the national security dangers of suspending the order.  On March 6th, 
Trump signed a second executive order, removing Iraq from the list of home countries barred 
from entry, along with the indefinite ban on Syrian refugees.  This order has also met challenges 
in the courts, where it remains as of this writing.   
 In addition to Trump’s executive orders, he has since advanced his most anticipated 
immigration policy: plans to construct a border wall on the southern border.  In his proposed 
budget, Trump “includes a $2 billion down payment on his signature border wall, one of the 
single largest investments in the budget plan,” along with plans “to hire 100 new government 
lawyers, add 1,500 law enforcement officials and spend more than $1 billion on detention and 
deportation” (Fandos, 2017). 
Public Opinion  
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The National Attitude Toward Immigration Levels from 2004 – 2016 
 Between 2004 and 2016, the national attitude toward immigration levels remained 
generally steady, gradually shifting toward an increasingly welcoming stance on immigration.  In 
2004, the nation’s post-9/11 shift toward more restrictive immigration level preferences was still 
visible; 33% of respondents favored present immigration levels in 2004 compared to 42% in 
June of 2001 and 49% favored decreased immigration levels in 2004 compared to 41% in June 
2001 (Gallup).  Following the restrictive shift after 9/11, beginning in approximately 2003, 
national attitudes toward immigration levels began to rebound, more closely resembling pre-9/11 
attitudes.  By 2016, attitudes toward immigration levels were actually more expansive than pre-
9/11 levels: 21% favored increased immigration levels compared to 14% in June, 2001 and 38% 
favored decreased levels compared to 41% in 2001.   
 In all, by 2016 Americans overwhelmingly accepted immigration as a “good thing for 
this country today”: 72% of American adults cited immigration as a “good thing,” the highest 
portion of respondents from 2001 to 2016 (Gallup).  A small racial divide was visible between 
respondents’ attitudes toward immigration: 70% of white respondents, compared with 76% of 
blacks and 79% of Hispanics thought immigration to be a “good thing,” while 27% of whites, 
compared with 18% of blacks and 17% of Hispanics called it a “bad thing.” These racial divides 
became starker regarding attitudes toward specific immigration policy proposals, as described 
below. 
Immigration Policy Proposals 
 Deportation 
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 A large majority of Americans opposed proposals to deport all undocumented immigrants 
residing in America (Gallup).  Yet, Whites responded more supportively to the proposal than 
Blacks and Hispanics.  In the Summer of 2016, 32% of American adults supported the proposal 
to deport all immigrants living illegally in the U.S., while 66% opposed the proposal.  Whites 
were more likely than the average American adult to support this proposal; 36% of whites 
declared their support for deportation while 62% opposed it.  Blacks and Hispanics were less 
likely to support deportation proposals: 23% of blacks and 21% of Hispanics were in support, 
while 76% of Blacks and 78% of Hipsanics were in opposition.   
 Building a Wall 
 Trump’s plans to build a border wall on the southern border were also generally opposed 
nationally (Gallup).  However, whites were found to be more likely to support Trump’s border 
wall than Black and Hispanics.  In the summer of 2016, nationally, one third of adults supported 
building the wall, while two thirds opposed the proposal.  41% of Whites, 23% strongly so, 
supported the wall’s construction, while 59% opposed the proposal.  In contrast, only 18% of 
Blacks and 16% of Hispanics supported the wall’s construction.  In fact, included within the 82% 
of Blacks and Hispanics who opposed a wall’s construction, 55% of Blacks and 40% of 
Hispanics “strongly opposed” the wall proposal.  
 Path to Citizenship  
 In general, national public opinion supported a path to citizenship for undocumented 
immigrants already residing in the U.S.  Nationally, 84% supported “allowing immigrants living 
in the U.S. illegally the chance to become U.S. citizens if they meet certain requirements over a 
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period of time” (Gallup).  Again, a slight racial difference was visible between whites’ support 
compared to blacks’ and Hispanics’.  In this case, Whites were as likely as Hispanics and Blacks 
to support paths to citizenship, but not with the same enthusiasm: 82% of Whites supported a 
pathway to citizenship with 37% declaring “strong support,” while 84% of Blacks and 92% of 
Hispanics supported a pathway to citizenship, 48% of Blacks and 42% of Hispanics declaring 
“strong support.”  
 Obama’s Executive Orders 
 The starkest racial difference regarding immigration policy support appeared when 
respondents gauged their approval of the “executive actions President Obama plans to take” 
(Gallup).  In this instance, American adults, responding in late 2014, were more likely to 
disapprove than to approve of President Obama’s planned executive orders.  However, Blacks 
and Hispanics were more likely to express approval than disapproval of Obama’s executive 
orders.  The gap between White support and minority approval was wide.  Only 30% of whites 
claimed their approval, compared to 68% of Blacks and 64% of Hispanics.  
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Figure 8: “Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2014 - 
Illegal Immigration - ProCon.org.” procon.org. 
http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844 (March 26, 2017). 
Partisan Opinions 
Immigrants’ Contributions 
 In  1994, 30% of Republicans and 32% of Democrats agreed with the following claim: 
“immigrants today strengthen the country because of their hard work and talents” (Jones, 2016).  
By 2006, Democrats’ acceptance of this positive view toward immigrants grew to 49%, while 
Republicans’ positive views increased, but at a slower rate to 36% (Figure 9).  Then, over the 
next decade, Democrats’ likelihood to agree with the statement on immigrants’ positive 
contributions to the country spiked, but Republicans’ remained stagnant: 78% of Democrats and 
35% of Republicans agreed with the statement in 2016. 
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Figure 9: Jones, Bradley. 2016. “Americans’ Views of Immigrants Marked by Widening 
Partisan, Generational Divides.” Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/04/15/americans-views-of-immigrants-marked-by-widening-partisan-
generational-divides/ (March 26, 2017). 
 The Wall 
 The partisan differences on immigration policy preferences were exceedingly visible in 
levels of support and opposition for the construction of a border wall.  Trump supporters (84% in 
support) were the most likely to favor the border wall proposal, while Bernie Sanders supporters 
(91% in opposition) were the most likely to oppose the proposal.  Supporters of more moderate 
candidates, such as John Kasich (53% opposed, 45% in support), were more mixed in support or 
opposition for the wall.   
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Figure 10: Jones, Bradley. 2016. “Americans’ Views of Immigrants Marked by Widening 
Partisan, Generational Divides.” Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/04/15/americans-views-of-immigrants-marked-by-widening-partisan-
generational-divides/ (March 26, 2017). 
The Nation’s “Top Problems” 
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 In 2016, 7% of respondents to the question, “What is the most important problem facing 
the country today” answered “immigration/illegal aliens” (Gallup Poll, 2016).  This was the 3rd 
most prevalent answer behind “economy in general” with 18% of respondents and 
“unemployment/jobs” at 8%.   
 
Figure 11: “Illegal Immigration, Population Estimates in the United States, 1969-2014 - 
Illegal Immigration - ProCon.org.” procon.org. 
http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844 (March 26, 2017). 
Interest Groups 
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FAIR  
 FAIR was a staunch opponent to Obama’s executive orders on immigration, urging “the 
next president to make it a priority to reverse the damage done by a rogue administration” 
(O’Brien et. al 2, 2016).  They deemed Obama’s orders to represent “amnesty programs” that 
“reward law-breakers and punish those who have followed the law” (O’Brien et. al 3, 2016). 
FAIR published a document that presented their opinion of how the winner of the 2016 
Presidential election ought act on immigration in their first year in office.  Not surprisingly, these 
proposals focused on enforcing existing immigration laws, especially on the border, restricting 
rights for undocumented immigrants, and limiting immigration overall.  
 In terms of enforcing immigration laws and securing the nation’s borders, FAIR 
advocated for the construction of a “physical barrier on the Southern border,” ending all “catch 
and release” policies that do not immediately require police to deport undocumented immigrants, 
and securing the northern Canadian border in order to “remain vigilant that third country foreign 
nationals do not exploit the northern border in an attempt to enter the U.S. undetected” (O’Brien 
et. al 2016, 6).  The proposals also supported increased punishment for repeat immigration law-
breakers.  Plus, FAIR denounced sanctuary cities that expressed leniency in enforcing 
immigration law.  Rather, FAIR advocates for the restoration of cooperation between federal, 
state, and local law enforcement in enforcing immigration law.  
 In addressing the undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S., FAIR 
vehemently opposed their access to public benefits.  They opposed amnesties of all kind, 
advocated for strict visa overstay policing, hoped to end “birthright citizenship,” opposed free 
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healthcare for the undocumented, and wished to vigorously prosecute undocumented 
immigrants’ employers. 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce  
 As expected, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was most concerned with immigrants’ role 
in the American workforce.  Regarding guest workers programs, the Chamber was in support of 
expanding both programs for both low-skilled and high-skilled foreign workers, especially aimed 
toward U.S.-educated STEM graduates.   
 Concerning the enforcement of immigration law, the Chamber supported the 
improvement of E-Verify, the employer verification system that allows employers to check on 
immigrants’ citizenship status.  Previously the Chamber had been opposed to E-Verify’s 
implementation because it shifted the responsibility of law enforcement onto American 
businesses, but by 2016 the Chamber had embraced the program, supporting its improvement. 
 To address the undocumented immigrants within the U.S., the Chamber denounced 
deportation and self-deportation as viable options, instead supporting an earned pathway to 
citizenship consisting of criminal background checks and national security clearances, a fine, 
progress toward English proficiency, and the government’s implementation of a mandatory 
electronic employment verification (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2015). 
MALDEF  
 Amid Donald Trump’s election, MALDEF released a statement regarding his 
immigration policy proposals, in which MALDEF denounced the border wall, claiming it 
“threatened to bankrupt the nation’s treasury” (MALDEF, 2017).   MALDEF also declared its 
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opposition to increased border security, charging “aggressive interior enforcement” to be “an 
abject failure, delivering tremendous upheaval and harm to families, schools, and workplaces” 
(MALDEF, 2017). 
NAACP  
 Throughout the 2016 election season, the NAACP sided with civil rights organizations to 
defend immigrants’ rights.  In this spirit, the NAACP pledged to “join with allies to show 
Congress that a broad, diverse coalition of conscience demands a fair and common sense path to 
citizenship” (Hesson, 2013).   
 In reaction to President Trump’s executive order’s ban of citizens from seven Muslim-
majority nations, the NAACP released a statement denouncing the orders, claiming they 
“indicate a callous disregard for civil liberties and the basic values of a nation born of 
immigrants” (NAACP, 2017).   
AFL-CIO  
 The AFL-CIO supported a “roadmap to citizenship, not just temporary status, for all 
workers” since “a broken immigration system ‘drags everybody down’ including wages for all 
workers” (“AFL-CIO Hopes,” 2015).  It supported Obama’s executive actions, as exemplified by 
the AFL-CIO’s workshops that helped immigrants capitalize on DACA’s provisions for 
deportation relief, as well as ensure their knowledge of workers’ rights (“AFL-CIO Hopes,” 
2015). 
 The labor union also explicitly opposed President Trump’s immigration proposals, 
including “building a wall on our border, scapegoating immigrants and refugees, and shutting out 
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people of Muslim faith,” which it claimed would “sow fear of raids among workers, promote 
racial profiling and erode core constitutional protections” (AFL-CIO, 2017). 
Party Platforms 
Democrats 
2008 Obama 
 The 2008 Democratic Party platform describes a general plan for comprehensive 
immigration reform, including efforts to stifle illegal immigration, such as improved border 
patrol and enhanced employer sanctions.  Specifically, the platform endorses the development of 
a method that allows employers to easily access potential employees’ legal statuses.  Plus, the 
platform includes provisions aiming to facilitate the integration of undocumented immigrants, 
such as increased work visas that promote family reunification.  With the domestic laborer in 
mind, the work visa provision does explicitly focus on family members of immigrants and 
“immigrants who meet the demand for jobs that employers cannot fill, as long as appropriate 
labor market protections and standards are in place.”  The platform also calls for a pathway to 
earned citizenship for undocumented immigrants already residing in the U.S.  The earned 
citizenship requires that immigrants “pay a fine, pay taxes, learn English, and go to the back of 
the line for the opportunity to become citizens” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). 
  2012 Obama 
 After Obama’s first term, the 2012 Democratic Party platform urged Congress to 
compromise on comprehensive immigration reform and highlighted President Obama’s 
successes in immigration reform despite congressional gridlock.  Overall, this platform proposes 
heavily expansive immigration reform, mainly regarding legal immigration and undocumented 
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immigrants already residing in the U.S. Plus, the platform boasts Obama’s progress in managing 
illegal immigration.  
  Regarding expansive reform, the platform calls for an earned pathway to citizenship, 
continued efforts toward family reunification, and increased English language learning resources 
for immigrants.  The earned pathway to citizenship includes learning English and paying taxes.  
Plus, the platform boasts Obama’s support for the DREAM Act, which was defeated by 
Republicans, along with President Obama’s executive order that provided temporary relief from 
deportation for undocumented children.  The explicit mention of earned citizenship for 
undocumented children could be considered a proposal for future immigration policy reform.    
In terms of addressing illegal immigration, the platform boasts Obama’s successes, 
claiming the Southwest border to be “more secure than in the past 20 years,” while “unlawful 
crossings are at a 40-year low” (“Party Platforms,” 2016).  It continues to support Homeland 
Security’s “prioritization of deporting criminals over non-threatening immigrants” and claims the 
“Border Patrol is better staffed than at any time in history.”  The platform does ensure that the 
administration is pro-employer sanctions, claiming that “we are continuing to hold employers 
accountable for whom they hire,” but without mentioning potential improvements or changes.  
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the platform explicitly opposes “states that sought to 
interfere with federal immigration law by passing local measures targeting immigrants, which 
the Obama administration challenged in court” (“Party Platforms,” 2016). 
 2016 Clinton 
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The 2016 Democratic Party platform proposes extremely expansive immigration reform.  
The lengthy list of expansive proposals included: a path to citizenship for undocumented 
immigrants residing in the U.S., support for family reunification, support for Obama’s DACA 
and DAPA executive orders, granting driver’s licenses and in-state college tuition to 
DREAMers, investing in English education programs, ending deportation raids of families and 
children, guaranteeing “government-funded counsel for unaccompanied children in immigration 
courts,” providing accessible healthcare to all, ridding government contracts with for-profit 
private prisons and detention centers, rejecting any “religious tests” required for immigration, 
and objecting to Donald Trump’s proposal to build a border wall (“Party Platforms,” 2016). 
 The platform fails to mention virtually any restrictive proposals, even the most basic: 
increased border patrol.  This differs from the 2012 and 2008 party platforms.   
Republicans 
 2008 McCain 
 The 2008 Republican Party platform includes a significant portion on immigration and 
illegal immigration, most of which included restrictive policy proposals.  The platform calls for 
increased border patrol and deportation efforts, restrictions to undocumented immigrants’ access 
to public benefits, defunding sanctuary cities, declaring English the official national language, 
and opposing amnesty in all forms.   
 Specifically, the platform focuses on enforcing “the rule of law” (“Party Platforms, 
2016).  Most directly, the platform urges for the employment of several thousand additional law 
enforcement officers, accelerated deportation efforts, as well as the completion of The Border 
Security First Act’s border fence.  The platform clearly articulates that the party considers efforts 
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advancing undocumented immigrants’ ability to assimilate to undermine the rule of law.  Access 
to drivers’ licenses, in-state college tuition, and social security are mentioned within the platform 
as examples that would encourage further illegal immigration. 
 To improve previously implemented employer sanctions, the platform supports the use of 
the E-Verify, an internet-based software aiming to “empower employers so they can know with 
confidence that those they hire are permitted to work” (“Party Platforms,” 2016) 
  2012 Romney 
 The 2012 Republican Party platform resembles the 2008 platform in its heavily restrictive 
nature, but an additional focus on guest workers programs was absent in 2008.  In 2012, the 
platform calls for an increase in “granting more work visas to holders of advanced degrees in 
science, technology, engineering, and math from other nations,” as well as “the utility of a legal 
and reliable source of foreign labor where needed through a new guest worker program” (“Party 
Platforms,” 2016).  It also adds, however, that the guest workers programs would “encourage 
illegal aliens to return home voluntarily, while enforcing the law against those who overstay their 
visas.” 
 Like in 2008, the “highest priority” for the 2012 platform was “to secure the rule of law 
both at our borders and at ports of entry.”  The restrictive provisions from the 2008 platform are 
echoed in 2012, yet intensified.  For example, the 2012 platform reiterated the 2008 platform’s 
support for the completion of the still incomplete border fence and for accelerated deportation 
processes, but the 2012 platform went on to support aerial surveillance efforts on the border and 
“long-term detention authority” for the Department of Homeland Security.      
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 Provisions restricting undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits also 
resembled the 2008 platform.  Although the 2012 platform fails to mention limiting 
undocumented immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses or social security, it does include support 
for the S.A.V.E. Program.  The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (S.A.V.E.) 
program is “an internet-based system that verifies the lawful presence of applicants—prior to the 
granting of any State or federal government entitlements or IRS refunds.”  The platform also 
endorses the Everify system for employers. 
 Per usual for the Republican Party, the 2012 platform rejects all forms of amnesty. 
  2016 Trump 
 The 2016 Republican Party platform continues the trend for Republican platforms, 
claiming again, “Our highest priority, therefore, must be to secure our borders and all ports of 
entry and to enforce our immigration laws” (“Party Platforms,” 2016).  The restrictive provisions 
included in the 2012 and 2008 platforms remain in the 2016 platform, but additional plans are 
included to respond to Obama’s executive orders, to combat “Islamic terrorism,” and to address 
an influx in refugee admittance.   
 Like previous Republican Party platforms, the 2016 platform opposes all forms of 
amnesty, endorses the E-verify and S.A.V.E. programs, and supports accelerated deportations 
and stricter penalties for immigrant smugglers and manufacturers of fraudulent documents.  New 
to the 2016 platform is the proposal for a border wall that would “cover the entirety of the 
southern border…sufficient to stop both vehicular and pedestrian traffic.”  Plus, the platform 
supported states that had enacted laws targeting undocumented immigrants, while advocating to 
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strip federal funds from cities considering themselves “sanctuary cities” for undocumented 
immigrants.   
 The platform makes a point to denounce President Obama’s executive orders on 
immigration, referring to them as “unlawful amnesties.”  Obama’s executive orders are framed 
as irresponsible given the perceived amount of “terrorism, drug cartels, human trafficking, and 
criminal gangs” plaguing the U.S.  Furthermore, the platform opposes Obama’s orders and any 
other provisions resembling amnesty because “the presence of millions of unidentified 
individuals in this country poses grave risks to the safety and sovereignty of the United States.”  
 The 2016 platform also includes provisions concerning refugee admittance and its 
supposed connection with “Islamic terrorism.”  To address these concerns, the platform exhibits 
concern with national security, explaining, “refugees who cannot be carefully vetted cannot be 
admitted to the country, especially those whose homelands have been the breeding grounds for 
terrorism.”  Drawing on terrorism’s place in American history, the platform urges for “special 
scrutiny to those foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States from terror-sponsoring 
countries or from regions associated with Islamic terrorism. This was done successfully after 
September 11, 2001, under the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, which should 
be renewed now.” 
Case Analysis 
Interest Group Analysis 
 FAIR 
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 FAIR rates high restrictive on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  FAIR 
supported restricting overall immigration levels and exclusively restrictive immigration policy, 
including the construction of a border wall, intensifying immigration law enforcement 
domestically, and restricting undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits.  
U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce rates low expansive on the immigration policy 
preference spectrum.  The Chamber supported expanding guest workers programs, as well as an 
earned pathway to citizenship, albeit a difficult one, for undocumented immigrants already 
residing in the U.S.   
 The Chamber did support the expansion and improvement of the E-Verify program, a 
digital program that allows employers to verify the citizenship status of potential employees.  
This is considered a restrictive program since employer sanctions limit undocumented 
immigrants’ ability to gain employment.   
MALDEF 
 MALDEF rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  
MALDEF supported President Obama’s executive orders that provided deportation relief, but 
also supported pathways to citizenship.  MALDEF strongly opposes all of President Trump’s 
immigration proposals, including heightened domestic immigration law enforcement, the 
construction of a border wall, and his executive orders banning visas.   
NAACP  
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 The NAACP rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  Their 
allegiance alongside other civil rights organizations in support of immigrants’ rights and in 
opposition to President Trump’s highly restrictive immigration policy proposals exemplifies the 
NAACP’s support for expansive immigration policy.  Plus, with both immigrants’ rights and 
black domestic workers in mind, the NAACP supports full citizenship for immigrant workers. 
AFL-CIO 
 The AFL-CIO rates high expansive on the immigration policy preference spectrum.  With 
an increasingly Hispanic membership, the AFL-CIO expresses concern with President Trump’s 
potentially discriminatory policy propositions.  Plus, with both immigrants’ rights and domestic 
workers’ interests in mind, the AFL-CIO supports full citizenship for immigrant workers.   
2016 Party Platform Analysis 
 Democratic Party Platform 
 The Democratic Party Platform rates high expansive on the immigration policy 
preference spectrum.  The platform proposes exclusively expansive immigration policy.  These 
expansive policy proposals include provisions for a pathway to citizenship for undocumented 
immigrants, expanded access to public benefits for undocumented immigrants, and ending 
private detention centers and prisons.  The platform fails to mention restrictive policy proposals, 
even the most basic: border enforcement.  This platform also endorses Obama’s executive 
orders, which provided deportation relief for undocumented immigrant children.  
 Republican Party Platform 
 The Republican Party Platform rates high restrictive on the immigration policy 
preference spectrum.  The platform proposes exclusively restrictive immigration policy.  The 
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platform opposes amnesty, proposes the construction of a border wall, supports employer 
sanctions, hopes to deny undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits, and suggests 
reinstituting post-9/11 vetting programs that aim extreme scrutiny on refugees from “areas 
associated with Islamic terrorism” (“Party Platform” 2016). 
Public Opinion Analysis 
 This study considers immigration to be salient in 2016 given its consideration as a “top 
problem facing the country today.”  Given immigration’s salience, we’d expect party platforms 
to cater to public opinion ahead of interest groups’ interests.   
 As in the 2004 case study, immigration is especially salient for the socially conservative 
portion of the Republican Party base.  Given the effective grassroots activism that socially 
conservative voters and activists have demonstrated in the past, most notably using far-right 
media, it would not be surprising if the Republican Party catered to this group’s interests above 
other portions of the party’s base.   
Case Conclusion 
  Bawn et. al’s theory of political parties applies well to immigration policy preferences of 
2016.  The theory would predict that amid heightened political salience and a shrinking 
“electoral blind spot” concerning immigration, political parties would cater to their electorate 
before pleasing interest groups.  In the case of immigration policy in 2016, this study’s findings 
support this hypothesis; both the Democratic and Republican Parties shift their focus toward 
pleasing the electorate first. 
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 The Democrats crafted an extremely expansive party platform in response to Democratic 
voters’ massive shift toward accepting immigrants as positive contributions to the country.  
Moreover, the Democratic Party fervently rejected Donald Trump’s restrictive immigration 
proposals. Reflecting the party’s attention to Democrats’ shift toward accepting immigrants, the 
platform does not mention proposals for increased border security or improved employer 
sanctions, both of which were restrictive policies included in past Democratic Party platforms.  
The platform’s increased thoroughness on immigration and its exclusively expansive policy 
proposals can be credited to immigration’s rise in salience.  
 The Democratic Party’s immigration stances align with both civil rights advocacy 
groups’ and labor’s immigration policy preferences.  In supporting pathways to citizenship and 
denouncing President Trump’s restrictive policies, the Democratic Party pleases their core 
interest groups.  It is worth noting that labor-oriented groups like the NAACP and AFL-CIO 
undoubtedly shifted toward more expansive policy preferences in the 2016 case study.  
Historically, these groups have supported some restrictive immigration policy, such as employer 
sanctions, and opposed some expansive policy, such as guest workers programs.  However, 
immigration’s context in 2016 can explain these shifts.  In the past, labor-oriented groups have 
supported restrictive policy provisions during congressional efforts toward comprehensive 
immigration reform.  Contrastingly, in 2016, immigration is framed in a restrictive nature and 
discourse is often framed in response to Trump’s restrictive policy proposals, leading to policy 
preferences that are contrastingly expansive.   
 The Republican Party platform also appears to cater to the electorate, only from the 
opposite side of the immigration policy preference spectrum.  The Republican platform includes 
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extremely restrictive immigration policy proposals, some of which did not appear in previous 
party platforms.  These restrictive policy stances included support for the border wall’s 
construction, hopes to limit undocumented immigrants’ access to public benefits, and stringent 
opposition of Obama’s executive orders’ deportation relief.   
 The Republican Party platform aligns well with FAIR’s interests, while the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce seems to be overlooked.  This is telling considering the Chamber 
historically acted as a primary core interest within the Republican Party.  However, this shift 
doesn’t necessarily mean the Republican Party hoped to please FAIR over the Chamber.   
 This study considers the Republican Party’s shift toward FAIR’s restrictive policy 
preferences as an attempt to cater to a socially conservative electorate amid immigration’s 
heightened salience, not a shift in the party’s core interest groups.  As exemplified by House 
Republicans’ hesitancy to engage in immigration reform compromises that include amnesty 
provisions, the fear of receiving electoral backlash from socially conservative voter bases has 
pressured Republicans to take hardline restrictionist immigration stances.  The New York Times’ 
story, “Steve Deace and the Power of Conservative Media,” demonstrates the shrinking 
“electoral blindspot” surrounding immigration policy, especially within the Republican Party: 
“the people who tune in daily to Deace (a popular grassroots conservative radio personality from 
Iowa) and his ultraconservative peers are also the ones most likely to vote and to follow closely 
the politicians they elect.” (Calmes, 2015).  The Republican Party’s submission to socially 
conservative voters makes sense given the ultra-right media’s tendency to “leave Democrats 
virtually unscathed in favor of attacking Republicans — the damned party ‘‘establishment,’’ in 
particular” (Calmes, 2015).   
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 Although the Republican Party autopsy after the 2012 presidential election encouraged 
the party to welcome comprehensive immigration reform in an effort to attract Hispanic voters, it 
appears this strategy was abandoned in 2016 in an effort to appeal to the party’s mostly white 
core constituents.  As described in the public opinion section, whites were much more supportive 
of Donald Trump’s plans to construct a border wall and they were more than doubly opposed to 
Obama’s executive orders than blacks and Hispanics.  The Republican Party’s acceptance of 
Trump’s exceedingly restrictive immigration policy appears to be a plea to its core constituents 
in order to remain electorally relevant, as expected within Bawn et. al’s theory amid 
immigration’s high political salience. 
VI: Comparative Analysis 
Did the model work?  
 
 This study considers Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties to apply well to the selected 
case studies.  The selected cases revealed that in periods when immigration’s political salience 
was low, political parties catered to core interest groups ahead of the electorate’s interests 
concerning immigration, and vice versa when immigration’s political salience was high. 
 The most demonstrative example of Bawn et. al’s “electoral blind spot” in action was the 
Republican Party’s response to immigration’s increased political salience in the 2004 case study.  
As political salience increases regarding an issue, Bawn et. al claims that the “electoral blind 
spot” surrounding the issue shrinks, meaning the electorate is more attentive to candidates’ 
decisions and more knowledgeable on the salient issue.  In 2004, immigration was not nationally 
salient, but it did become salient for a portion of the Republican Party voter base: the socially 
conservative.  Given grassroots social conservatives’ electoral influence as effective grassroots 
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activists, the Republican Party’s immigration policy stances become more restrictive in order to 
cater to socially conservative voters.     
 Some cases more clearly exhibited Bawn et. al’s theory in action.  The 2004 and 2016 
cases showcased instances when immigration became politically salient, at least within a portion 
of the electorate.  For this reason, the study’s variables were more visible, allowing for more 
information upon which to evaluate the application of Bawn et. al’s theory. 
 In the 1984 case, immigration was not politically salient.  In effect, party platforms were 
brief and vague when referring to immigration policy.  This made it difficult to evaluate parties’ 
allegiance to core interest groups or the electorate.  This study was still able to analyze cases 
when immigration was not politically salient, but the analyses were based on less supportive 
evidence than in cases when immigration was politically salient.  Ultimately, this study 
concluded that the vague 1984 platforms were partially due to political parties’ aims to please as 
many core interest groups as possible, some of which possessed conflicting interests concerning 
immigration policy.   
Variables 
 
Independent Variable: Interest Groups’ Immigration Policy Preferences 
 
 This study’s independent variable, interest groups’ immigration policy preferences, was 
measured qualitatively through analyzing interest groups’ publications, congressional hearing 
statements, and newspaper reports.  Data was generally easy to find, especially given the case 
studies’ temporal proximity to immigration policy reform efforts.  
 One weakness in this study’s evaluation of interest groups is the absence of measuring 
interest groups’ influence on political parties.  Campaign contribution data is not available for all 
interest groups and even when it is, many interest groups provide support to political parties non-
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financially, through other forms of activism.  This study could more clearly evaluate the 
relationship between political parties and interest groups with a better understanding of how 
influential each interest group is to each political party. 
 Another weakness in evaluating interest groups was specific to some of the Democratic 
Party’s core interest groups: ethnic advocacy groups.  Ethnic advocacy groups served as a 
somewhat problematic variable because their interests were identical to a large portion of the 
electorate’s interests due to the advocacy groups’ inherent missions to represent their peoples’ 
interests.  That is, when the electorate’s interests shifted, ethnic advocacy groups’ interests 
shifted identically.  This made it difficult to decipher whether the Democratic Party was catering 
to either the electorate or core interest groups.  Thankfully, in this study, MALDEF and the 
NAACP did not have identical interests since the NAACP is generally more concerned with 
domestic labor than MALDEF.  This provided some differentiation in the Democratic Party’s 
motives. 
 
Dependent Variable: Political Party Immigration Policy Stances 
 
 To measure this study’s dependent variable, political parties’ immigration policy stances, 
party platforms were analyzed for each case study. Given this study’s goal, to examine political 
parties’ adherence to interest group and electorate interests, party platforms are useful because 
they explicitly announce the party’s support or opposition to ideologies and policy proposals.  
 One weakness of using party platform to evaluate political parties’ policy stances is the 
fact that platforms are only published in Presidential election years.  For this study, this limits the 
ability to evaluate parties’ stances during periods between elections.  For example, in the 2004 
case study, the parties’ immigration policy stances were evaluated from the 2004 party 
platforms, but immigration reform efforts took place mostly in 2006 and 2007.   
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 Another weakness of party platforms is the lack of exposure platforms receive.  Most 
voters do not thoroughly examine each party’s platform prior to voting, so parties’ incentive to 
publish their most accurate stances may be limited.   
Conditional Variable: Immigration’s Political Salience 
 To measure this study’s conditional variable, immigration’s political salience, national 
polling concerning “the nation’s most important problem” was examined.  This was a successful 
methodology, although throughout the research process, it became clear that national salience 
does not provide a complete understanding of whether an issue is politically salient.  In the 2004 
case study, for example, immigration was not found to be nationally salient.  However, within 
the socially conservative portion of the Republican Party’s base, immigration was immensely 
salient.  It is important for future studies to consider numerous voter subsets’ issue prioritization, 
not only the issue’s salience on a national scale.    
Immigration Policy Framework 
 Using immigration policy reform as a framework to apply Bawn et. al’s theory of 
political parties presented both benefits and weaknesses to this study.  The main weakness in 
using immigration policymaking as a framework is the “strange bedfellow coalitions” that divide 
traditional partisan coalitions when debating immigration policy reform.  For example, the 
Republican Party’s core interest groups, business and the socially conservative are usually in 
agreement on issues of governance.  However, in regard to immigration policy, the business 
community thrives off of immigrant labor and encourages welcoming immigration policies, 
while the socially conservative often take stringent positions concerning the enforcement of law 
and order that restrict immigration and immigrants’ ability to work and live in the country.  
These “strange bedfellow coalitions” place political parties into a difficult position, forcing them 
to either choose to support some, but not other interest groups’ interests, or to toe the line of 
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compromise between interest groups.  To avoid dismissing any interest group’s interests, parties 
may make vague claims regarding immigration policy.  Such vague party policy positions make 
it difficult to understand parties’ true policy stances. 
 “Strange bedfellow coalitions” were also beneficial to this study’s analyses.  Amid 
immigration’s heightened political salience, when Bawn et. al predicts a decreasing “electoral 
blind spot,” parties are pressured to articulate concrete policy positions.  When parties’ policy 
positions become more clear, it is easier to evaluate parties’ loyalty to interest groups versus the 
electorate.  Since “strange bedfellow coalitions” split parties’ bases, parties are bound to favor 
one portion of their base’s interests over another when establishing concrete policy preferences.  
If Bawn et. al’s model applies well, parties ought to favor the portion of their base that is more 
electorally influential.  For instance, in the 2016 case study, immigration was considered 
nationally salient.  However, the Republican Party’s policy proposals undoubtedly favored the 
socially conservative portion of their base over the business community portion.  This makes 
sense according to Bawn et. al’s model considering the socially conservative electorate’s known 
ability to organize electorally to advance their interests concerning immigration. 
Implications for Future Work 
 For studies like this one, which applies Bawn et. al’s theory on political parties to cases 
of immigration policymaking, it may be beneficial to simultaneously apply Bawn et. al’s theory 
to a supplemental policymaking issue besides immigration.  Immigration’s “strange bedfellow 
coalitions” create non-traditional policymaking adversaries and allies, often splitting parties’ 
core bases.  Simultaneously examining a policymaking issue that promotes more traditionally 
partisan coalitions may promote a better understanding for parties’ motives in immigration 
policymaking.    For instance, in the case of immigration policymaking, parties sometime 
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resorted to vague immigration policy stances in order to appease their divided base.  If contrasted 
against another issue, parties’ motives may become clearer depending on how parties cater to 
core interest groups in other policymaking arenas. 
 Party polarization is another important consideration for future work.  As seen in this 
study’s 2016 case, each party, amid high political salience, resorted to extreme positions on 
opposing sides of the political spectrum.  The Republican Party resorted to extreme stances prior 
to the Democratic Party in order to appease the grassroots activists of the Party’s socially 
conservative base.  As pointed out in Grossman and Hopkins’ asymmetrical party theory, the 
Democratic Party does not have an equivalently radical subsection of their base.  When applying 
Bawn et. al’s theory, it is important to consider not just national salience, but also issue salience 
within voter subsets. 
 One final consideration for future research concerns racial institutional orders, which are 
discussed within chapter two as a framework of understanding for American issues, including 
immigration.  King and Smith described two competing racial institutional orders within 
American policymaking: the white supremacist order and the egalitarian order.  Especially 
within the context of immigration reform, this framework could be a useful dichotomy to frame 
policymaking battles as racial divides become stark, as seen in the 2016 case study regarding 
support for specific immigration policy proposals.  
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